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JUDICIAL REVIEW - DETAILED STATEMENT OF FACTS |
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Claimant: ANYONE In the High Court of Justice Claim No. (HQ________) Queens
Bench Division Administrative
Court Claimant THE QUEEN on the application of ANYONE
and Defendant YOUR DISTRICT COUNCILSTATEMENT
OF FACTS ACCOMPANYING CLAIM FORM FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 1.
The
Claimant lives at YOUR ADDRESS, hereafter referred to as ‘TSH’,
a property situated in Somewhere in England or
Wales centred at
grid reference TQ 000 1234. 2.
The
Claimant first occupied TSH as his home in April 1982, approximately 22
years ago. At this time TSH
was known as “The Barnhouse”. The
property has also been known as “Oakwood.” 3.
The
Claimant purchased TSH later in 1982, then sold TSH in 1990 to a
business associate during which transfer he retained and retains an
option to purchase. 4.
According
to English Heritage TSH is the last surviving early electricity
generating works in Sussex, it dating from about 1900.
Since 1999, the building has been included on a Monument
Protection Programme begun in June 1994 (See Schedule).
Consequently, experts in the field of archaeology recognise that
TSH is in need of protection. (Ref. Monuments at Risk Survey) 5.
In
1982 TSH was in a serious state of disrepair and in imminent danger of
collapse. The encroachment
of fast growing sycamore trees, brambles and the accumulation of years
of leaf droppings, had partially engulfed the building and hidden other
important archaeological features. 6.
Between
1982 to 1983, the Claimant prevented collapse of the main generating
building, cleared the site of immediate flora encroachment and removed
sycamore trees growing out of buildings, on roofs and those overhanging
the main structure. It
should have been obvious to anyone that these works were essential if
the building was to be preserved, they constituting a statutory nuisance
under Part III of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, in that aphids
excrete honeydew which falls onto the roof and is a source of moulds and
spores which adversely affects the roofing material. 7.
The
Defendant is the Claimant’s local authority. 8.
Since
about 1983, the Defendant began using its position of authority to
prevent the Claimant restoring the historic site, beginning with the
issue of a tree preservation order Number 34 1983 (See Schedule). 9.
The
Defendant constantly monitored the site.
In the very early years, the Defendant’s officers visited
myself once or twice a month. However,
visits during the early years were not recorded.
In later years a tally was begun now counted at 181 visits, as a
means of estimating the cost to the ratepayer and imbalance, where the
Defendant was prepared to spend substantial sums to prevent me working
to restore the historic building, but nothing at all to assist this
endeavour. 10.
The
correspondence referred to by date and other reports, decision letters
and Court orders included in the accompanying bundles will show that the
Defendant blocked every viable beneficial use of the premises and issued
enforcement notices seeking to halt both commercial and residential uses
of the building (See Schedule). 11.
Whereas,
according to English Heritage it is the Defendant’s duty to protect
the historic built environment. It
is their duty to consult generally and guidance as to consultation
concerning historic buildings and conservation, at that time between
1983 and 1986 is contained in Circular 22 of 1980 (See Schedule). 12.
Not
only is it the Defendant’s duty to protect historic buildings as
defined by Planning Policy Guidance notes 15 and 16, but the
Defendant’s Local Plan(s) contain policies such as to allow them to
grant planning permission concerning historic buildings as an exception
to normal policies of constraint in the countryside.
However, the Defendant ignored their policies where the Claimant
was concerned. 13.
A
report to committee concerning car repairs, referenced C/87/83/HX names
the Claimant and reveals personal details, not relevant to the planning
forum and in breach of other legislation (confidential issue), but
designed to colour the minds of the members and confuse issues.
This same report advises members of the electricity generating
origins, apparently as confirmed by neighbours, but fails to address
this fact in connection with their local policies designed to protect
historic buildings. 14.
According
to Local Ombudsman Report 94/B4989 and 95/B2327 (See Schedule), the
identity of the occupier or owner of a site are not material planning
considerations. Hence, such
information likely to divert the attention of councillors away form the
genuine issues is a source of confusion, such that the members may have
believed they had a duty to consider such issues as pertinent to
authorising enforcement action. 15.
A
report some two years later, to committee referenced C/56/85/HX
concerning use of the building for residential purposes, did not mention
the generating history attaching to the building.
Consequently, the members did not consider the fate of the
building, being a stand-alone, historic unit, bereft of any reasonable
or beneficial use, contrary to the Wednesbury principle of
reasonableness. Whereas,
had the members known of the neighbours letters and the failure to
consult, it is likely enforcement would have been deferred for further
reports and crucially, consultation. 16.
After
consideration of the above report C/56/85/HX the Defendant served the
Claimant with an enforcement notice dated 18 April 1986, requiring him
to cease using the main building and a tool store for residential
purposes. This was appealed
to the Secretary of State, but could not be appealed to the High Court,
because there is/was no right of appeal on matters of fact. 17.
At
appeal, the Claimant offered his opinion that the building was of
historic significance, but was unable to produce evidence to support his
belief. The Defendant
produced no evidence either, but denied the history and crucially,
failed to produce letters in their possession from neighbours confirming
the generating history, or to reveal that they had not consulted either
the county archaeologist or English Heritage.
Nor did they adduce the reports on which the enforcement had been
authorised, for challenge as to procedural irregularity. 18.
An
Inspector Dannruether, conducted the appeal informally.
In doing so he compounded the Defendant’s procedural
irregularities in agreeing with them the building was/is constructed of
corrugated iron, which it is not. In
the absence of consultation reports and any corroborating evidence as to
the history, or the evidence on which the committee had authorised this
and earlier enforcement action, the Inspector upheld the notice. 19.
However,
since that time it has been firmly established in planning law, as
precedent, that any decision made by a planning committee on incorrect
information, an unbalanced report, or where there is perceived bias,
that such imbalance will invalidate any decision so made, as not within
their power to make it, hence it is ultra vires. The first of these
precedents, R v Canterbury City Council, was set in 1993 (See
Schedule). 20.
Regardless,
of the 1993 precedent, and confident their procedural irregularity would
remain undiscovered, the Defendant pressed on with further enforcement
by way of injunctions, in 1995, seeking to build on the 1986 enforcement
notice. 21.
However,
as the enforcement notice is procedurally flawed as described above,
hence ultra vires, no amount of building on it by way of injunctions, is
capable of repairing the flaws. The
injunctions are themselves of no value. 22.
In
addition, there is the ‘four-year rule’ to consider. If the 1986 notice was issued in April 1986 and occupation
began some time between April and May of 1982, then if the 1986
enforcement notice was poorly founded, the residential occupation
thereafter is lawful at all times as per the Town & Country Planning
Act 1972. According to this
Act, after the expiration of four years, the Defendant may not
thereafter seek to enforce and the use complained of became immune. 23.
In
1995 and 1996 the Claimant was party to planning applications for
residential and commercial uses referenced WD/95/2284/F and WD/96/1767/F
(See schedule). These
applications offered the Defendant the opportunity to correct their
earlier procedural errors, and to confirm the history.
However, their expert, Chezel Bird, gave evidence to the planning
committee (See schedule) that the building was of “no historic
interest” and was not the electricity generating station as the
Claimant had stated. 24.
Whereas,
had the Defendant found a history attaching to the building, they would
then be obliged to apply local policies (See schedule), which empowered
them to grant planning consent to protect the historic built
environment. Indeed, Ms
Bird made reference to these policies, as did the Claimant, she
nevertheless failed to consult generally, which as an ex English
Heritage employee, is quite extraordinary. 25.
During
1996 and 1997, the Defendant sought yet more injunctive relief.
Also two applications for committal in 1997.
The last of these injunctions barred The Claimant from occupying
a caravan anywhere in the Wealden district.
He was also forced to remove all toilet, food preparation and
washing facilities, from the premises, in effect to strip the building
back to a bare shell. In so doing the Defendant further discouraged restoration
works to the historic building, adding to the disincentive by seeking
and securing part of the attendant appeal costs and newly pursuing these
with the intention to bankrupt the Claimant. 26.
At
appeal in March 1997, concerning the 1995-96 applications, Inspector
Michael agreed that by upholding the Defendant’s refusals, he
recognised that the Claimant’s Human Rights had been breached, but
that as the building held no historic interest worthy of conserving, he
had no choice but to dismiss the appeals.
The Inspector did not enquire of the Defendant as to the results
of their third party consultations, as per Planning Policy Guidance note
16 (See schedule PPG16). 27.
It
should be noted that the Defendant council put the injunctions before
Inspectors and their own committee by way of character assassination, so
inferring further reason to refuse subsequent planning applications,
which matters are not material planning considerations. 28.
In
July of 1997 the Claimant discovered by chance, evidence to confirm the
history of TSH building, in the form of an affidavit given by Ronald
Saunders, who visited the building afresh and confirmed its origins.
Copy of this affidavit was supplied to the Planning Inspectorate
for Inspector Michael, but returned by the government office in 1998
unopened. 29.
In
1998 a representative from the Sussex Industrial Archaeology Society
surveyed TSH. They too
confirmed the history attaching to the building.
The Defendant council’s response to a fresh planning
application WD//98/0996/F dated 8 May 1998 (See Schedule) was to
‘decline’ to consider the new confirmation as to the history. 30.
During
1999, the Claimant contacted the County Archaeologist and thence English
Heritage, who provided copies of the Monument Protection Programme begun
in 1994 (See schedule) and advised of the correct consultation procedure
as per PPG16. Thus the
Claimant re-applied for planning permission in April 1999 referenced
WD/99/0810/F (See schedule). Where
the Defendant still seemed shy of consulting the experts, the Claimant
newly apprised of the correct procedure, consulted directly. 31.
Consequently,
an independent survey was commissioned by East Sussex County Council, at
the request of the County Archaeologist.
Whereas, English Heritage confirmed ‘considerable local
historic interest’ for TSH and referred the building for inclusion on
the above mentioned Monument Protection Programme. 32.
Despite
the mounting expert support for conservation via a residential
conversion, the Defendant continued to obstruct and delay determination.
Finally, in March 2000, the planning committee heard the
application, however a more subtle subterfuge ensued, where the members
appear to have been persuaded prior to the meeting, to accept a refusal
and recommend to the Claimant that he should re-apply for a commercial
use. 33.
Whereas,
Inspector Michael had dismissed a commercial use in this location
absolutely by reason of access and traffic difficulties contrary to the
East Sussex Local Plan, which decision was itself based on the arguments
of the Defendant, they supplying colour photographs to prove the point
and introducing the East Sussex Local Plan.
That the same planning officer, who prepared the report to
committee, appears to have had a memory lapse as to the disamenity he
argued against. Clearly,
the members should have had regard to Inspector Michael’s reasons for
not introducing commercial activity into Lime Park. 34.
In
August 2000 a Mr C Hudson, discovered that the Defendant had known of
the history in 1985, when the council accidentally provided him with a
file containing a letter from Elizabeth Cowling to the council advising
of the electricity generating origins.
This was the first time the Claimant knew of such matters. Later, he was anonymously posted copies of the Reports to committee
between 1983 and 1985 (See schedule). 35.
Consequently, the Claimant brought these matters to the attention
of the Defendant via their chief executive, monitoring officer, planning
chairman and leading members to include the leader of the council
between 2001 and 2002. 36.
Additionally, the Claimant put the Defendant on Notice concerning
his occupation of TSH as his home.
Despite this, the Defendant failed to enforce. Such failure effectively denying him his right to a fair
hearing, concerning the 1986 enforcement notice, yet perpetuating a
situation where the historic building was kept without a recognised
reasonable and beneficial stand-alone use. 37.
The Defendant continued to harass the Claimant, seeking to enter
his home by devious manner and on one occasion in April 2002 under a
warrant, which appeared to have been obtained by deception. When challenged as to its validity and their authorisation,
the Defendant’s agents immediately withdrew.
On leaving, the solicitor accompanying the council’s
enforcement officer, was heard to say: “Don’t worry we’ll try
something else”. 38.
Then on 23rd September 2002, the Defendant sought to
obtain possession of TSH by means of a charging order.
By this means the council hoped to deprive the Claimant of his
home and skirt around the defective 1986 enforcement notice issue.
However, the Claimant filed a defence bringing the above to the
attention of the Court, whereupon on the 4th October the
Defendant hastily withdrew. The
Claimant asserts this change of position amounts to an admission by the
Defendant that they are not entitled to the sums claimed for the reasons
stated herein. 39.
Where
all of the above mentioned agents of the Defendant refused to review the
matters complained of herein, despite provisions allowing for review,
and when the matters were again brought to the attention of the fresh
influx of members, new chief executive and leading members of the
council to include their cabinet, and met with a stone wall in 2003, the
Claimant then offered the Defendant mediation in June 2003.
This they refused by email in July of 2003.
Hence, the Claimant asserts the Defendant is acting contrary to
the Wednesbury rule of reasonableness and in the circumstances
irrationally. 40.
However, although refusing to mediate, the Defendant pursued costs
obtained in relation to the stripping of the building of all facilities
and the banning of the Claimant from the Wealden area.
In the circumstances, this appears unreasonable and contrary to
the Wednesbury rule of reasonableness. 41.
The Claimant again wrote to the Defendant’s Monitoring Officer,
copy to their chief executive and cabinet members in December 2003,
January and March of 2004 bringing the circumstances of the matter to
their attention with regard to mediation, the proposed claim for
judicial review and calling for a report to full council as is required
to be reported in theses circumstances by the Local Government &
Housing Act 1989 as amended. 42.
The Defendant replied to the Claimant’s correspondence via their
so-called Monitoring Officer on the 9th February 2004,
refusing mediation and the compilation of a report to the full council.
Hence, the Defendant confirmed it is content to continue to
interfere with the Claimant’s home and possessions and to allow a
situation to prevail where a historic building is at risk. 43.
Whereas, it is unlawful for the Defendant to interfere or to seek
to interfere or uphold an interference with my home or possessions as
per Article 8 of the Human Rights Act and part III of the first Protocol
Article 1. 44.
Despite
the existence of the enforcement notice upon which the Defendant relies,
the Claimant continues to occupy TSH as his home.
However, in claiming the 1986 notice is extant and in failing to
address the issues put to them seeking to gain recognition for this
historic building, the Claimant has demonstrably suffered interference
by this local authority, damage and loss, and continues to suffer said
interference from this local authority inasmuch as they refuse to act to
put the matter right, in any measure or at all, also contrary to the
Citizens Charter as contained in PPG 1 (See schedule). 45.
The
Defendant has long been aware of the deteriorating roof and defective
rainwater goods, which deterioration they accelerated by seeking to
protect nuisance trees, and is presently causing deterioration of and
likely to cause further deterioration of the timber framework of the
historic building, such damage being expensive to rectify and such works
unnecessary in any event had the Defendant properly considered matters. 46.
The
Claimant has been in a state of limbo concerning TSH which is blighted
by the extant enforcement notice. There
is no incentive to invest in a deteriorating historic building, since
every time he endeavoured to do so, the Defendant has come against him
using every means at their disposal to thwart said works, in the process
seeking costs with the stated intention to bankrupt and destroy him. 47.
Whereas,
according to English Heritage the Defendant is charged to encourage
owners/occupiers to ensure the adequate maintenance of historic
buildings, to keep them wind and weather tight and to address
functionally redundant buildings before they reach crisis point. 48.
This
is the cause of much stress worry and anxiety to the Claimant,
manifesting itself in stomach ulcers, sleeplessness and other symptoms
associated with the build up of stress, adding to the said interference
in his home and private life. 49.
The
existence of the extant enforcement notice is preventing the Claimant
enjoying a standard of living and comfort the Defendant offers to other
occupiers of historic buildings, but denies to him in inconsistency or
discrimination. Whereas,
such denial, in a modern world, is not compatible with the standard of
living he should be entitled to and may be viewed as inhumane treatment. 50.
The method of protection identified by English Heritage as per
their Step 4 report dated June 2000, is to bring the building back into
use via the planning process. The
incentive to properly restore TSH, with peace of mind and security as to
the necessary investment, may only be achieved once the defective
enforcement notice is set aside or otherwise declared void. 51.
The Claimant asserts the correspondence passing between himself and
the Defendant and other evidence will demonstrate, that at no time has
this local authority offered any genuine assistance to him as to
securing a reasonable beneficial use for the historic building he has
occupied over the relevant 22 years, and especially so where it is in
the public interest to conserve evidence of the past development of our
civilisation for future generations. 52.
The Claimant asserts the correspondence passing between himself and
the Defendant and other documents will also show that enforcement and
planning reports prepared by the Defendant concerning him, are one
sided, sought to discredit him, gave weight to matters not material to
the planning process and relied on information and later on decisions
they knew to be incorrect, hence exhibited bias and or indifference in
the extreme, about which the Claimant seeks assistance from this
honourable Court by way of an effective remedy. 53.
By reason of the Defendant’s said unconstitutional behaviour,
obstruction and or negligence, as described above, the Claimant has
suffered personal trauma, loss and damage.
If you wish to apply to the High Court for a Judicial Review, you will need to leave to apply on Form N461
You will also need to supply separately a:-
"Detailed Statement of Grounds" = The statute, common law, government guidance or precedent not taken into account by your local authority
"Detailed Statement of Facts" = Your story - the events as they occurred to cause the injustice
"Details of Remedy" = What you want the Court to do to put things right, an order quashing a decision, compensation, etc.
"Evidence you rely on" = Sufficient documents or other exhibits to show the Judge you have documentary support to qualify your application - as a numbered bundle.
THE LINKS TO THE ABOVE DOCUMENTS ARE GIVEN BY WAY OF EXAMPLE - BUT WERE PREPARED BY A LITIGANT IN PERSON, WITH NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN MAKING SUCH APPLICATIONS
Notes for guidance N461 Guidance Notes Witness Summons N20 Witness Summons Application for Urgent Consideration N463 URGENT Consideration
The Fee to make an application for leave is £30. A further fee of £100 is payable as and when your application for leave to apply is granted. It costs £30 to ask the Court to issue a Witness Summons.
THANKS: Lastly, I would again like to say to the growing number of affected members of the public who telephone or email me, that I am so very pleased if anything we have published can be used to further just decision making in this great country of ours. We just want to keep it great. The encouragement is mutual!
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