Claimant:   ANYONE


In the High Court of Justice                                                                         Claim No.  (HQ________)

Queens Bench Division

Administrative Court


Claimant                                                              THE QUEEN    on the application of  ANYONE




Defendant                                               YOUR DISTRICT COUNCIL



1.             The Claimant lives at YOUR ADDRESS, hereafter referred to as ‘TSH’, a property situated in Somewhere in England or Wales centred at grid reference TQ 000 1234.

2.             The Claimant first occupied TSH as his home in April 1982, approximately 22 years ago.  At this time TSH was known as “The Barnhouse”.  The property has also been known as “Oakwood.”

3.             The Claimant purchased TSH later in 1982, then sold TSH in 1990 to a business associate during which transfer he retained and retains an option to purchase.

4.             According to English Heritage TSH is the last surviving early electricity generating works in Sussex, it dating from about 1900.  Since 1999, the building has been included on a Monument Protection Programme begun in June 1994 (See Schedule).  Consequently, experts in the field of archaeology recognise that TSH is in need of protection. (Ref. Monuments at Risk Survey)

5.             In 1982 TSH was in a serious state of disrepair and in imminent danger of collapse.  The encroachment of fast growing sycamore trees, brambles and the accumulation of years of leaf droppings, had partially engulfed the building and hidden other important archaeological features.

6.             Between 1982 to 1983, the Claimant prevented collapse of the main generating building, cleared the site of immediate flora encroachment and removed sycamore trees growing out of buildings, on roofs and those overhanging the main structure.  It should have been obvious to anyone that these works were essential if the building was to be preserved, they constituting a statutory nuisance under Part III  of the Environmental Protection Act 1990, in that aphids excrete honeydew which falls onto the roof and is a source of moulds and spores which adversely affects the roofing material.

7.             The Defendant is the Claimant’s local authority.

8.             Since about 1983, the Defendant began using its position of authority to prevent the Claimant restoring the historic site, beginning with the issue of a tree preservation order Number 34 1983 (See Schedule).

9.             The Defendant constantly monitored the site.  In the very early years, the Defendant’s officers visited myself once or twice a month.  However, visits during the early years were not recorded.  In later years a tally was begun now counted at 181 visits, as a means of estimating the cost to the ratepayer and imbalance, where the Defendant was prepared to spend substantial sums to prevent me working to restore the historic building, but nothing at all to assist this endeavour.

10.         The correspondence referred to by date and other reports, decision letters and Court orders included in the accompanying bundles will show that the Defendant blocked every viable beneficial use of the premises and issued enforcement notices seeking to halt both commercial and residential uses of the building (See Schedule).

11.         Whereas, according to English Heritage it is the Defendant’s duty to protect the historic built environment.  It is their duty to consult generally and guidance as to consultation concerning historic buildings and conservation, at that time between 1983 and 1986 is contained in Circular 22 of 1980 (See Schedule).

12.         Not only is it the Defendant’s duty to protect historic buildings as defined by Planning Policy Guidance notes 15 and 16, but the Defendant’s Local Plan(s) contain policies such as to allow them to grant planning permission concerning historic buildings as an exception to normal policies of constraint in the countryside.  However, the Defendant ignored their policies where the Claimant was concerned.

13.         A report to committee concerning car repairs, referenced C/87/83/HX names the Claimant and reveals personal details, not relevant to the planning forum and in breach of other legislation (confidential issue), but designed to colour the minds of the members and confuse issues.  This same report advises members of the electricity generating origins, apparently as confirmed by neighbours, but fails to address this fact in connection with their local policies designed to protect historic buildings.

14.         According to Local Ombudsman Report 94/B4989 and 95/B2327 (See Schedule), the identity of the occupier or owner of a site are not material planning considerations.  Hence, such information likely to divert the attention of councillors away form the genuine issues is a source of confusion, such that the members may have believed they had a duty to consider such issues as pertinent to authorising enforcement action.

15.         A report some two years later, to committee referenced C/56/85/HX concerning use of the building for residential purposes, did not mention the generating history attaching to the building.  Consequently, the members did not consider the fate of the building, being a stand-alone, historic unit, bereft of any reasonable or beneficial use, contrary to the Wednesbury principle of reasonableness.  Whereas, had the members known of the neighbours letters and the failure to consult, it is likely enforcement would have been deferred for further reports and crucially, consultation.

16.         After consideration of the above report C/56/85/HX the Defendant served the Claimant with an enforcement notice dated 18 April 1986, requiring him to cease using the main building and a tool store for residential purposes.  This was appealed to the Secretary of State, but could not be appealed to the High Court, because there is/was no right of appeal on matters of fact.

17.         At appeal, the Claimant offered his opinion that the building was of historic significance, but was unable to produce evidence to support his belief.  The Defendant produced no evidence either, but denied the history and crucially, failed to produce letters in their possession from neighbours confirming the generating history, or to reveal that they had not consulted either the county archaeologist or English Heritage.  Nor did they adduce the reports on which the enforcement had been authorised, for challenge as to procedural irregularity.

18.         An Inspector Dannruether, conducted the appeal informally.  In doing so he compounded the Defendant’s procedural irregularities in agreeing with them the building was/is constructed of corrugated iron, which it is not.  In the absence of consultation reports and any corroborating evidence as to the history, or the evidence on which the committee had authorised this and earlier enforcement action, the Inspector upheld the notice.

19.         However, since that time it has been firmly established in planning law, as precedent, that any decision made by a planning committee on incorrect information, an unbalanced report, or where there is perceived bias, that such imbalance will invalidate any decision so made, as not within their power to make it, hence it is ultra vires. The first of these precedents, R v Canterbury City Council, was set in 1993 (See Schedule).

20.         Regardless, of the 1993 precedent, and confident their procedural irregularity would remain undiscovered, the Defendant pressed on with further enforcement by way of injunctions, in 1995, seeking to build on the 1986 enforcement notice.

21.         However, as the enforcement notice is procedurally flawed as described above, hence ultra vires, no amount of building on it by way of injunctions, is capable of repairing the flaws.  The injunctions are themselves of no value.

22.         In addition, there is the ‘four-year rule’ to consider.  If the 1986 notice was issued in April 1986 and occupation began some time between April and May of 1982, then if the 1986 enforcement notice was poorly founded, the residential occupation thereafter is lawful at all times as per the Town & Country Planning Act 1972.  According to this Act, after the expiration of four years, the Defendant may not thereafter seek to enforce and the use complained of became immune.

23.         In 1995 and 1996 the Claimant was party to planning applications for residential and commercial uses referenced WD/95/2284/F and WD/96/1767/F (See schedule).  These applications offered the Defendant the opportunity to correct their earlier procedural errors, and to confirm the history.  However, their expert, Chezel Bird, gave evidence to the planning committee (See schedule) that the building was of “no historic interest” and was not the electricity generating station as the Claimant had stated.

24.         Whereas, had the Defendant found a history attaching to the building, they would then be obliged to apply local policies (See schedule), which empowered them to grant planning consent to protect the historic built environment.  Indeed, Ms Bird made reference to these policies, as did the Claimant, she nevertheless failed to consult generally, which as an ex English Heritage employee, is quite extraordinary.

25.         During 1996 and 1997, the Defendant sought yet more injunctive relief.  Also two applications for committal in 1997.  The last of these injunctions barred The Claimant from occupying a caravan anywhere in the Wealden district.  He was also forced to remove all toilet, food preparation and washing facilities, from the premises, in effect to strip the building back to a bare shell.  In so doing the Defendant further discouraged restoration works to the historic building, adding to the disincentive by seeking and securing part of the attendant appeal costs and newly pursuing these with the intention to bankrupt the Claimant.

26.         At appeal in March 1997, concerning the 1995-96 applications, Inspector Michael agreed that by upholding the Defendant’s refusals, he recognised that the Claimant’s Human Rights had been breached, but that as the building held no historic interest worthy of conserving, he had no choice but to dismiss the appeals.  The Inspector did not enquire of the Defendant as to the results of their third party consultations, as per Planning Policy Guidance note 16 (See schedule PPG16).

27.         It should be noted that the Defendant council put the injunctions before Inspectors and their own committee by way of character assassination, so inferring further reason to refuse subsequent planning applications, which matters are not material planning considerations.

28.         In July of 1997 the Claimant discovered by chance, evidence to confirm the history of TSH building, in the form of an affidavit given by Ronald Saunders, who visited the building afresh and confirmed its origins.   Copy of this affidavit was supplied to the Planning Inspectorate for Inspector Michael, but returned by the government office in 1998 unopened.

29.         In 1998 a representative from the Sussex Industrial Archaeology Society surveyed TSH.  They too confirmed the history attaching to the building.  The Defendant council’s response to a fresh planning application WD//98/0996/F dated 8 May 1998 (See Schedule) was to ‘decline’ to consider the new confirmation as to the history.

30.         During 1999, the Claimant contacted the County Archaeologist and thence English Heritage, who provided copies of the Monument Protection Programme begun in 1994 (See schedule) and advised of the correct consultation procedure as per PPG16.  Thus the Claimant re-applied for planning permission in April 1999 referenced WD/99/0810/F (See schedule).  Where the Defendant still seemed shy of consulting the experts, the Claimant newly apprised of the correct procedure, consulted directly.

31.         Consequently, an independent survey was commissioned by East Sussex County Council, at the request of the County Archaeologist.  Whereas, English Heritage confirmed ‘considerable local historic interest’ for TSH and referred the building for inclusion on the above mentioned Monument Protection Programme.

32.         Despite the mounting expert support for conservation via a residential conversion, the Defendant continued to obstruct and delay determination.  Finally, in March 2000, the planning committee heard the application, however a more subtle subterfuge ensued, where the members appear to have been persuaded prior to the meeting, to accept a refusal and recommend to the Claimant that he should re-apply for a commercial use.

33.         Whereas, Inspector Michael had dismissed a commercial use in this location absolutely by reason of access and traffic difficulties contrary to the East Sussex Local Plan, which decision was itself based on the arguments of the Defendant, they supplying colour photographs to prove the point and introducing the East Sussex Local Plan.  That the same planning officer, who prepared the report to committee, appears to have had a memory lapse as to the disamenity he argued against.  Clearly, the members should have had regard to Inspector Michael’s reasons for not introducing commercial activity into Lime Park.

34.         In August 2000 a Mr C Hudson, discovered that the Defendant had known of the history in 1985, when the council accidentally provided him with a file containing a letter from Elizabeth Cowling to the council advising of the electricity generating origins.  This was the first time the Claimant knew of such matters.  Later, he was anonymously posted copies of the Reports to committee between 1983 and 1985 (See schedule).

35.         Consequently, the Claimant brought these matters to the attention of the Defendant via their chief executive, monitoring officer, planning chairman and leading members to include the leader of the council between 2001 and 2002.

36.         Additionally, the Claimant put the Defendant on Notice concerning his occupation of TSH as his home.  Despite this, the Defendant failed to enforce.  Such failure effectively denying him his right to a fair hearing, concerning the 1986 enforcement notice, yet perpetuating a situation where the historic building was kept without a recognised reasonable and beneficial stand-alone use.

37.         The Defendant continued to harass the Claimant, seeking to enter his home by devious manner and on one occasion in April 2002 under a warrant, which appeared to have been obtained by deception.  When challenged as to its validity and their authorisation, the Defendant’s agents immediately withdrew.  On leaving, the solicitor accompanying the council’s enforcement officer, was heard to say: “Don’t worry we’ll try something else”.

38.         Then on 23rd September 2002, the Defendant sought to obtain possession of TSH by means of a charging order.  By this means the council hoped to deprive the Claimant of his home and skirt around the defective 1986 enforcement notice issue.  However, the Claimant filed a defence bringing the above to the attention of the Court, whereupon on the 4th October the Defendant hastily withdrew.  The Claimant asserts this change of position amounts to an admission by the Defendant that they are not entitled to the sums claimed for the reasons stated herein.

39.         Where all of the above mentioned agents of the Defendant refused to review the matters complained of herein, despite provisions allowing for review, and when the matters were again brought to the attention of the fresh influx of members, new chief executive and leading members of the council to include their cabinet, and met with a stone wall in 2003, the Claimant then offered the Defendant mediation in June 2003.  This they refused by email in July of 2003.  Hence, the Claimant asserts the Defendant is acting contrary to the Wednesbury rule of reasonableness and in the circumstances irrationally.

40.         However, although refusing to mediate, the Defendant pursued costs obtained in relation to the stripping of the building of all facilities and the banning of the Claimant from the Wealden area.  In the circumstances, this appears unreasonable and contrary to the Wednesbury rule of reasonableness.

41.         The Claimant again wrote to the Defendant’s Monitoring Officer, copy to their chief executive and cabinet members in December 2003, January and March of 2004 bringing the circumstances of the matter to their attention with regard to mediation, the proposed claim for judicial review and calling for a report to full council as is required to be reported in theses circumstances by the Local Government & Housing Act 1989 as amended.

42.         The Defendant replied to the Claimant’s correspondence via their so-called Monitoring Officer on the 9th February 2004, refusing mediation and the compilation of a report to the full council.  Hence, the Defendant confirmed it is content to continue to interfere with the Claimant’s home and possessions and to allow a situation to prevail where a historic building is at risk.

43.         Whereas, it is unlawful for the Defendant to interfere or to seek to interfere or uphold an interference with my home or possessions as per Article 8 of the Human Rights Act and part III of the first Protocol Article 1.

44.         Despite the existence of the enforcement notice upon which the Defendant relies, the Claimant continues to occupy TSH as his home.  However, in claiming the 1986 notice is extant and in failing to address the issues put to them seeking to gain recognition for this historic building, the Claimant has demonstrably suffered interference by this local authority, damage and loss, and continues to suffer said interference from this local authority inasmuch as they refuse to act to put the matter right, in any measure or at all, also contrary to the Citizens Charter as contained in PPG 1 (See schedule).

45.         The Defendant has long been aware of the deteriorating roof and defective rainwater goods, which deterioration they accelerated by seeking to protect nuisance trees, and is presently causing deterioration of and likely to cause further deterioration of the timber framework of the historic building, such damage being expensive to rectify and such works unnecessary in any event had the Defendant properly considered matters.

46.         The Claimant has been in a state of limbo concerning TSH which is blighted by the extant enforcement notice.  There is no incentive to invest in a deteriorating historic building, since every time he endeavoured to do so, the Defendant has come against him using every means at their disposal to thwart said works, in the process seeking costs with the stated intention to bankrupt and destroy him.

47.         Whereas, according to English Heritage the Defendant is charged to encourage owners/occupiers to ensure the adequate maintenance of historic buildings, to keep them wind and weather tight and to address functionally redundant buildings before they reach crisis point.

48.         This is the cause of much stress worry and anxiety to the Claimant, manifesting itself in stomach ulcers, sleeplessness and other symptoms associated with the build up of stress, adding to the said interference in his home and private life.

49.         The existence of the extant enforcement notice is preventing the Claimant enjoying a standard of living and comfort the Defendant offers to other occupiers of historic buildings, but denies to him in inconsistency or discrimination.  Whereas, such denial, in a modern world, is not compatible with the standard of living he should be entitled to and may be viewed as inhumane treatment.

50.         The method of protection identified by English Heritage as per their Step 4 report dated June 2000, is to bring the building back into use via the planning process.  The incentive to properly restore TSH, with peace of mind and security as to the necessary investment, may only be achieved once the defective enforcement notice is set aside or otherwise declared void.

51.         The Claimant asserts the correspondence passing between himself and the Defendant and other evidence will demonstrate, that at no time has this local authority offered any genuine assistance to him as to securing a reasonable beneficial use for the historic building he has occupied over the relevant 22 years, and especially so where it is in the public interest to conserve evidence of the past development of our civilisation for future generations.

52.         The Claimant asserts the correspondence passing between himself and the Defendant and other documents will also show that enforcement and planning reports prepared by the Defendant concerning him, are one sided, sought to discredit him, gave weight to matters not material to the planning process and relied on information and later on decisions they knew to be incorrect, hence exhibited bias and or indifference in the extreme, about which the Claimant seeks assistance from this honourable Court by way of an effective remedy.

53.         By reason of the Defendant’s said unconstitutional behaviour, obstruction and or negligence, as described above, the Claimant has suffered personal trauma, loss and damage.



If you wish to apply to the High Court for a Judicial Review, you will need to leave to apply on Form N461


You will also need to supply separately a:-


"Detailed Statement of Grounds" =  The statute, common law, government guidance or precedent not 

                                                    taken into account by your local authority


"Detailed Statement of Facts"     =   Your story - the events as they occurred to cause the injustice


"Details of Remedy"                   =   What you want the Court to do to put things right, an order 

                                                    quashing a decision, compensation, etc.


"Evidence you rely on"               =   Sufficient documents or other exhibits to show the Judge you have 

                                                    documentary support to qualify your application - as a numbered 





Notes for guidance                            N461 Guidance Notes

Witness Summons                             N20 Witness Summons 

Application for Urgent Consideration     N463 URGENT Consideration


The Fee to make an application for leave is £30.  A further fee of £100 is payable as and when your application for leave to apply is granted.  It costs £30 to ask the Court to issue a Witness Summons.


THANKS: Lastly, I would again like to say to the growing number of affected members of the public who telephone or email me, that I am so very pleased if anything we have published can be used to further just decision making in this great country of ours.  We just want to keep it great.  The encouragement is mutual!