PARTICULARS OF CLAIM AND STATEMENT OF CASE - KRUSCHANDL v WEALDEN DISTRICT COUNCIL AND OTHERS QUEENS BENCH DIVISION, STRAND LONDON, CASE NUMBER HQ03X03821

IN THE HIGH COURT - STRAND - LONDON

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IN THE HIGH COURT Case No.

QUEENS BENCH DIVISION

BETWEEN:

YOUR NAME

Claimant

and

YOUR COUNCIL (1)

Cllr. (2)

Cllr. (3)

Cllr. (4)

Cllr. (5)

Cllr. (6)

Chief Executive (7)

Officer mrtpi (8)

Directorr (9)

(10)

Director (11)

Solicitor (12)

Officer mrtpi (13)

Officermrtpi (14)

Officer (15)

Defendants

__________________________________________________________________________________________

PARTICULARS OF CLAIM

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THE CLAIMANT

The Claimant is and has been at all material times the occupier of YOUR HOUSE, hereafter referred to as TSH, a property situated in Lime Park, Herstmonceux in East Sussex.
The Claimant first occupied TSH as his home in April 1982, approximately 22 years ago. At this time TSH was known as "OTHER NAME”. The property has also been known as “Oakwood.”
The date of first occupation can be traced back via a Search Certificate lodged by Hart Read & Co., solicitors with the 1^st Defendant on the 2^nd April 1982 and issued by the Defendant Council on the 15^th April 1982, this certificate being in relation to 4 Lime Park, which at the time included TSH.
The Vendor had allowed the purchaser(s) early access to the properties to allow them to begin clearance works, they being to all intents vacant. The 1^st purchaser Mr & Mrs Nikolia Askaroff in turn rented TSH to the Claimant, and thence transfer TSH to the Claimant, which had been agreed in principle. The rental period lasted approximately 8 weeks before the Claimant’s formal offer to purchase had been accepted by the 1^st purchaser.
TSH provides living accommodation and studio/workshop facilities courtesy of large garages and an office, which facilities enable the Claimant, as a design engineer, to work from home.
The Claimant is 48 years of age. When he first occupied TSH he was therefore 26 years of age. The Claimant asserts that these are the most physically productive years of a person’s life, where the Claimant had to physically produce prototype designs.
Throughout his occupation of TSH the Claimant has suffered interference in the peaceful enjoyment of his home and possessions, such interference occasioned by his local authority, being the 1^st Defendant and manifesting itself firstly in the guise of enforcement action, said action in denial of their duty to protect the historic built environment.
Since first occupation of TSH the Claimant resisted the said interference and continues to challenge the unrelenting interference. Accordingly, the most productive part of the Claimant’s life has been burdened with the task of dealing with the said interference of a building said by experts to be of considerable local historic importance, which the Defendant’s deny.
Whereas, the Defendant officers have sought to conceal the said history attaching to TSH by not advising Members of the relevance and not consulting generally with local archaeological groups, the County Archaeologist or English Heritage, for fear such procedure would reveal the true historic value and they would not then be able to recover, so as to continue their agenda to enforce against the Claimant’s occupation in perversity. By which reason the Claimant asserts, together with other reasons, the Defendant(s) original enforcement action is inherently defective and wrong, and about which the Claimant seeks Declarations.
Whereas, the Defendant(s) have granted beneficial residential planning consents to other occupiers of redundant buildings in their jurisdiction, these buildings being without any specific local importance, thereby operating a policy of discrimination against the Claimant.
THE CLAIMANT ASSISTING THIRD PARTY ENFORCEE’S Since about 1997 the Claimant has been approached by members of the public suffering enforcement action by the 1^st Defendant, with a view to representing those members of the public, they having heard of the interference he has suffered by the Defendant(s).
Accordingly, and in particular concerning the unlawful demolition of stables situated at Bushy Wood Farm on the A22 in East Sussex, the Claimant felt obliged to represent the owners and their rescued animals at Appeal, who would otherwise been unable to defend themselves against the 1^st Defendant.
Whereas, the Horse Sanctuary were ultimately successful in obtaining planning permission to rebuild their stables, the need for them having been established at Appeal. However, the 1^st Defendant has neither settled their costs, nor compensated them as to rebuild, the said unlawful demolition being merely a device to harm the Sanctuary’s Appeal. Accordingly, a website was established to expose the 1^st Defendant, which website the 1^st Defendant wishes to remove.
Similarly, the Claimant has assisted other persons (mostly farmers) concerning enforcement, where the 1^st Defendant appears inconsistent in their planning approvals, on the one hand, and enforcement on the other. This taken with the website: www.bushywood.com warning persons about the 1^st Defendant using real case history and newspaper clippings, has angered the 1^st Defendant and especially so where they have taken legal advice as to ways of removing the said website in the knowledge it is protected by Article 10 of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the precedent set in Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd. 1992 QB770.
THE FIRST DEFENDANT The 1^st Defendant is and has been at all material times the Claimant’s Local Authority.
The 1^st Defendant is a public body as defined by S. 6(3)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998, and/or a corporation carrying out a public function, known as Wealden District Council, whose offices are located at Vicarage Lane, Hailsham and Pine Grove, Crowborough in East Sussex.
The Claimant asserts that in their role as his Local Authority, the 1^st Defendant owes the Claimant certain duties as set out by Her Majesty’s Government in Law and as Policy Guidelines and in accordance with precedent(s) established in a Court of Law or other officially recognised forum, to be reasonable, present accurate and balanced reports and to take steps not to harm or otherwise prejudice the Claimant’s best interests.
The Growth of the power of public and quasi-public bodies over the lives of individuals, has diluted the power of parliament to scrutinise legislation.
That this is so is stated in a letter from the DETR dated 21^st May 1999. Wherein, it is confirmed: “….local authorities are …… autonomous bodies, largely independent of central government”. “Local authorities are however, answerable to both the Courts and the District Auditor”.
THE MEMBER DEFENDANTS The 2^nd Defendant, Nigel Coltman, is the Leader of the Defendant Council. In this role the 2^nd Defendant holds a special position and is able to exert influence over any committee he is a member of, or over other members with whom he comes into contact.
The 3^rd Defendant, Norman Buck, is thought to have some accountancy experience. He is also a member of the 1^st Defendant’s Executive Cabinet and it is thought to be a member of the 1^st Defendant’s Finance Committee. As such he is able to exert influence over any committee he is a member of, or over other members with whom he comes into contact.
The 4^th Defendant, Jack Gore, is the Chairman of the Defendant Council and prior to this was a Cabinet Member with responsibility for planning. In his role as Chairman, the 4^th Defendant is able to exert influence over the 1^st Defendant and any committee he is a member of, or over other members with whom he comes into contact.
The 5^th Defendant, Sylvia Tidy, is a former Chairman or Deputy Leader of the 1^st Defendant. She has also held high positions in the Strategic Planning and Economic Development committee known as SPED and is a member of the Executive Cabinet. As such she is able to exert influence over any committee she is a member of and other members she comes into contact with. The 5^th Defendant is also concerned with conservation issues.
The 6^th Defendant, Raymond Parsons, is a former Chairman of the 1^st Defendant. He has sat on planning committees for a number of terms and is now a member of the Executive cabinet. As such he is able to exert influence over any committee he is a member of and over any members with whom he comes into contact.
According to the positions or rank identified above, the Defendants numbered 2 to 6 are elected Members of the 1^st Defendant. These particular councillors, except the 4^th Defendant, are members of the Cabinet, which committee effectively oversees the running of other committees and the 1^st Defendant as a corporate body, and the appointment of officers, and as such are the controlling mind of the member contingent of the 1^st Defendant.
As a result of recent email communication, the Claimant has learned of another member of the Cabinet with responsibility for financial matters, not included as a Defendant in person. This member, councillor David Logan, has demonstrated unwillingness to investigate the matters complained of so as to assist the Claimant, but conversely confirms his willingness to investigate further where there is the possibility of causing additional harm to the Claimant.
After consideration of the evidence, it may be deemed appropriate to join councillor David Logan as the 16^th Defendant regarding what appears to be either, wilful misconduct and/or reckless indifference.
THE OFFICER DEFENDANTS The 7^th Defendant, Charles Lant, is the current Chief Executive of the 1^st Defendant. As such he has overall responsibility for ensuring the proper administration of the 1^st Defendant at all times, in accordance with a fair and balanced performance on his own part and his instructing Members.
The 8^th Defendant, Ashley Brown, was the District Planning Officer and/or Director of Environmental Services, with overall responsibility for planning until very recently. He is understood to be a member of the Royal Town Planning Institute. He is working out time in a different area of employment within the 1^st Defendant, to qualify for additional pension rights.
The 8^th Defendant is an amateur archaeologist, thought to have lobbied the Members of the 1^st Defendant on conservation issues relating to a windmill at Argos Hill, concerning the need for regular maintenance, which windmill belongs to the Defendant Council.
The position of Director of Environmental Services, recently vacated by the 8^th Defendant is presently shared between the 9^th, 10^th and 11^th Defendant, until the 1^st Defendant appoints an officer to this position.
The 9^th Defendant, Daniel Goodwin, is the Director of Corporate Services responsible for financial matters pertaining to the 1^st Defendant. In common with the 10^th and 11^th Defendant’s he shares responsibility for Environmental Services, which includes planning and enforcement.
The 10^th Defendant, Michael Fleming, is the Director of Property Services. In common with the 9^th and 11^th Defendant’s he shares responsibility for Environmental Services, which includes planning and enforcement.
The 11^th Defendant, Mary Clare Deane, is the Director of Community Services. In common with the 9^th and 10^th Defendant she shares responsibility for Environmental Services, which includes planning and enforcement.
The 12^th Defendant, Victorio Scarpa, is a solicitor acting for the 1^st Defendant since at least 1986 and at all material times thereafter. He is currently the 1^st Defendant’s Legal Services Manager.
The 13^th Defendant, David Phillips, claims to be a member of the Royal Town Planning Institute. He has been the 1^st Defendant’s enforcement officer since at least 1991 and at all material times thereafter. He also holds responsibility for conservation matters.
The 14^th Defendant, Ian Kay, is understood to be a member of the Royal Town Planning Institute. He has been a senior planning officer and/or Assistant District Planning Officer with the 1^st Defendant since at least 1983 and at all material times thereafter, except in the last year where he has assumed the position of District Planning Officer, so having a hands on involvement with the Claimant’s case and in particular any matter involving TSH property.
The 15^th Defendant, Paul Barker, claims to have many years of conservation experience. He is listed on the Institute of Historic Buildings (IHB) website. Since at least 1999 and at all material times thereafter, he has been employed by the 1^st Defendant as their conservation officer.
According to the positions or rank identified above, the Defendants numbered from 7 to 15 and identified by name function as the controlling minds of the officer contingent of the 1^st Defendant, where the Claimant is concerned.
EMPLOYEES OF THE 1^st DEFENDANT So far as the employment of staff is concerned, the 1^st Defendant derives its powers from S.112 of the Local Government Act 1972 (or as amended). This section allows the 1^st Defendant to: “appoint such officers as they think is necessary for the proper discharge of such of their……functions as fall to be discharged by them,”
According to the precedent set in Hazell v Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council 1992 2AC 1 at p 37, Lord Templeman emphasised: “A local authority owes a duty to its ratepayers to preserve ratepayers funds and to arrange for proper administration.”
Both the members and officers of the 1^st Defendant, and those members and officers identified as Defendant’s 2 to 15 come under the heading ‘public authority’ as defined by S. 6(3)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 being: any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature.
The Claimant asserts that the 1^st Defendant is vicariously liable for the tortious acts or omissions of its employees, tortious negligence or for acting without reasonable concern for the protection of the Claimant, the Claimant’s rights, or the historic building he occupies, as reckless indifference or wilful misconduct.
The Claimant asserts that the Defendants identified by numbers 2 to 15 are liable for their acts or omissions in negligence or for acting without reasonable concern for the protection of the Claimant, the Claimant’s rights, or the historic building he occupies.
Further and alternatively, the Claimant asserts that the member Defendant(s) identified by numbers 2 to 6 are themselves liable and/or vicariously liable for their failure to prevent the 1^st Defendant and the Defendants identified by numbers 7 to 15 regarding their acts or omissions in negligence or for acting without reasonable concern for the protection of the Claimant, the Claimant’s rights, or the historic building he occupies.
CLAIMANTS RIGHTS UNDER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 The Human Rights Act 1998 protects the right of the Claimant concerning the peaceful enjoyment of his home without interference by a local authority as guaranteed by Article 8 and Part 3 of the first Protocol Article 1.
The Human Rights Act 1998 also protects the claimants right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10.
The Human Rights Act 1998 protects the right of the Claimant to a fair hearing within a reasonable time as guaranteed by Article 6.
The Claimant also derives protection from common law as to the restoration of his civil rights and precedent already established by the Courts and the Secretary of State.
Equally, prior to the enactment of our domestic Human Rights legislation in October 2000, the Courts have had regard to and or directed others to have regard to the European Convention of Human Rights.
EFFECT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 Prior to October 2000, there were only common law remedies where a local authority failed to adhere to procedural requirements. This situation offered little or no protection against the acts or omissions of public bodies that harmed the fundamental rights of the citizen.
Since the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force on 2^nd October 2000, citizens now have ‘positive’ rights to protection from violations of their fundamental rights and especially against the acts or omissions of public bodies.
In this matter the 1^st Defendant under the control and execution of the Defendants separately identified and numbered 2 to 15, failed to preserve or take steps to preserve or restore the Claimant’s fundamental rights as a citizen of the United Kingdom and as protected by the Human Rights Act in Articles 6; 8; 10 and Part 3 of the first Protocol Article 1.
In this regard the Claimant is now able to insist that he should be left alone and/or allowed to peacefully enjoy his home or possessions. Whereas, in this case it is the omissions of the Defendant(s) that have harmed the Claimant in disproportion to their positive acts designed to punish the Claimant for standing up for his rights.
The Claimant asserts that where a breach of his rights prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, continues past the point of enactment into the present, then in those circumstances the situation preceding the said enactment may be brought within the scope of these present proceedings and the circumstances described may then be considered by the Court.
In particular and where the 1^st Defendant gained Injunctions in breach of the Claimants rights as defined by Articles 6, 8, 10 and Part 3 of the first Protocol Article 1, prior to enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, and continue to uphold and rely on those Injunctions and to pursue costs in relation to those matters, the Claimant asserts that S.7(1)(b) may be invoked as a valid defence or alternatively, where the Injunctions are relied on by the Defendants to stifle the rights of the Claimant, he is entitled to seek declarations as to the continued validity of the said Injunctions or other remedy as may be available from the Court.
COMMON LAW OFFENCES Regarding local authority employees, the common law offence of misconduct in public office applies generally to every person who is appointed to discharge a public duty and who receives compensation in whatever form; salary, expenses and the like. This principle was clearly established in the case of R. v Bowden 1995 Court of Appeal (98 1 WLR).
It has been established in law that a law enforcement officer, witness to an assault has a duty to preserve the peace and protect the victim. A failure to do so is seen as wilful neglect. This decision was upheld in the case of R. v Dytham 1979 (467 3 WLR) Court of Appeal. This case established that an officer of a public body so omitting to take steps to protect the private person, or to arrest his assailants or otherwise bring them to account, constitutes the crime of failing to carry out a duty of his office.
In law it is an offence to do anything, which the ordinary man in the street might regard as harassment. This is seen in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 in Section 1 – A person must not pursue a course of conduct a) which amounts to harassment of another; and b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other. It is further stated in Section 2. – (1) A person who pursues a course of conduct in breach of section 1 is guilty of an offence.
Whereas, the Defendant(s) ought to have known: 1) that the repeated (181 recorded) visitations on the Claimant at his home and threats as to bankruptcy, and 2) that the abject refusal or failure to do anything to correct the perceived injustice, or 3) the failure to address or review the imbalanced reports, so as to perpetuate decisions appearing to be ultra vires, is tantamount to abandoning a victim of mental and/or actual assault, hence a failure to carry out a duty of office.
That the criminal element of the above may not be within the jurisdiction of the Claimant’s Claim in the High Court, however in this event the Claimant asserts this may be addressed via the interference with the Claimant’s peaceful enjoyment of his home. Additionally, a civil claim may be otherwise pursued. Hence, the elements of a Malicious Prosecution generally associated with criminal proceedings may transmute to a Course of Malicious Conduct in this present civil action.
It is averred this is so where to prosecute is to instigate legal proceedings against, pursue or carry on, hence become the prosecuting party in any legal proceedings, and that this description would include the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings as part of the said Course of Malicious Conduct. Should this not be the case, the Claimant would ask the Court for leave to amend his Particulars, such as to perfect his Claim(s).
JURISDICTION, COMPENSATION & ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION Section 8(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, gives the appropriate Court a wide power to grant such relief, remedies, or orders as it considers just and appropriate.
By virtue of s. 8(3) damages may be awarded to afford ‘just satisfaction’.
Section 8(4) provides that in determining whether to award damages and the amount to award, the Court must take account of the principles applied by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to awards of compensation under Article 41 of the Convention.
In the case of a violation of Articles 6 and 8, then according to the requirement of Article 13: where the member states should provide a real and effective remedy in a domestic Court, it may be appropriate in the circumstances described herein to order an investigation capable of leading to the identification and/or punishment of the/those person/persons responsible for sustaining the injustices complained of herein as per Edwards v United kingdom 2002 35 EHRR 487.
That the member and officer Defendant(s) believe and continue to be assured by their legal department they may continue to harm the Claimant with complete immunity as to the consequences of their actions or failure to act, such immunity appears not to be compatible with Article 13, for if there is a blanket immunity against tortious neglect or reckless indifference, then there may be no effective remedy. The perpetrators remain aloof as if they had no part in it, whereas they were themselves directly responsible for perpetuating the injustices described elsewhere in this document.
Additionally, the Claimant is recently advised by the District Auditor, that their power to apply Surcharges for wilful misconduct, has been repealed by the Local Government Act 2000. Hence at this time, it appears this safety net to effective remedy is gone, about which the Claimant seeks confirmation.
Accordingly, an effective and proportionate remedy in this matter may be to prevent the persons directly responsible from holding office, where compensation alone may not be effective or in the wider public interest, which might leave the said responsible person(s) at liberty to cause harm to other members of the public, and where the 1^st Defendant owes the Claimant as a member of the public, a duty to appoint staff suitable to fulfil their administrative function. This was formerly part of the District Auditors function as seen in the Audit Commission Act 1998 S. 17 (2) (a) and (b).
Alternatively, and in proportion to the harm occasioned the Claimant, compensation alone may be a sufficient remedy for the injustices complained of provided the sum of compensation is sufficient to reflect on the 1^st Defendant(s) such as to cause them henceforth not to neglect the Claimant concerning his Human Rights. However, it is noted that in all cases the requisite remedy must be effective in both practice and law and not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of state authorities as per Aksoy v Yurkey 1996 23 EHRR 553.
The Claimant as a litigant in person, is given to understand and believes that the High Court is the proper forum recognised in law in which to present his Claims as set out in this document and as may be set out in other documents, with the leave of the Court and in the interests of ensuring a fair hearing.
Section 6 (3) (a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 makes Courts and Tribunals public authorities, and so subject to their own primary duty to act compatibly with the Convention and where necessary, develop the law.
Should the High Court not be the correct forum in which the Claimant should seek corrective injunctions and damages as described elsewhere in this Statement of Case, then if that is identified by the Court, the Claimant will seek the leave of the Court to transfer these proceedings or to apply in the appropriate Court, and on this issue the Claimant respectfully seeks the assistance of the Court, by way of directions, in the interests of ensuring a fair hearing.
As per the preceding paragraph, and especially concerning the possibility of Judicial Review, if that is considered to be the, or more appropriate cause of action to pursue, then on this issue too, the Claimant respectfully seeks the assistance of the Court, by way of directions, in the interests of ensuring a fair hearing.
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PUBLIC AUTHORITIES The Claimant asserts that S. 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 gives the victim of any act or omission of a public authority, which is incompatible with the Convention, power to challenge the authority in court using the Convention to found a cause of action as follows: a) Section 7 (1) (a) permits a victim of an act or failure to act, which infringes a Convention right to bring proceedings in the appropriate Court. b) Section 7 (1) (b) permits a person to rely on the Convention rights or rights concerned in any legal proceedings against a public authority.
TIME LIMITATIONS The Claimant asserts that the time for bringing this present action falls to be considered by the Human Rights Act 1998, where Section 7(5) imposes a limitation period of twelve months for bringing proceedings under S. 7(1) (a), which may be extended with the leave of the Court.
The Claimant further asserts that the matters complained of are ongoing, in that the Defendant(s) continue to deny the Claimant his civil rights and continues to act in a perverse and/or oppressive manner, or alternatively irrationally and/or unreasonably having regard to the circumstances herein set out separately and/or collectively contrary to the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998.
In that the matters complained of are ongoing, the Claimant asserts he is not time barred, which might otherwise restrict his cause of action, subject to an order of the Court so extending the or any time limits, in the interests of ensuring a fair hearing or of securing justice as per S.7 of the Human Rights Act.
In so far as time limits may prevent the Claimant obtaining justice, if such time limits are inflexible, this may prevent the Claimant securing an effective remedy as per Article 13 of the European Convention.
In so far as the Claimant’s present Claims may be subject to time limits, he relies on the fact that the course of conduct complained of may have begun some time ago, but that the 1^st Defendant will not relent and is unrepentant.
Had the 1^st Defendant acceded to the reasonable request of the Claimant to agree to mediation or indeed for their Monitoring Officer to compile a Report as required under the Local Government Act, the injustice complained of could then have been identified and subsided.
Equally, where it is the 1^st Defendant’s intention to bankrupt the Claimant it must be the case that the Defendant(s) continue to escalate their chosen course of conduct and in so doing confirm the Claimant’s Claims concerning live issue and non-repentance.
PARTICULARS OF THE CLAIMANTS EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE The Claimant asserts that in the circumstances where the 1^st Defendant has been offered many and regular opportunities to correct the matters complained of, and just in the last six months refused an offer of mediation and further invitation to investigate the Claimant’s case and refused, it is unlikely this matter may now be concluded without the need to litigate, this being the fault of the Defendant Council.
The Claimant will produce evidence both oral and documentary to demonstrate that the Defendant(s) routinely acted without regard to the rights of the individual and also produced reports to committee heavily biased, and that in that event also refuse to prepare a report or fully or properly consider complaints and that in this regard on the rare occasion when a complaint has been put to the Local Government Ombudsman and upheld the complaint, the Defendant(s) have failed to fulfil their statutory duty as laid out in the Local Government and Housing Acts.
Although the Claimant continues to assert that should the Defendant(s) have agreed to reasonable negotiation, the matter could indeed have been disposed of without the need for litigation, but that the Defendant(s) are not disposed to be reasonable.
The fact that the Defendant(s) issued a Statutory Demand with the intention of stifling the Claimants civil rights and causing further harm, is testament to the Defendant(s) mind set in the matter.
Further and subsequent to Issuing this/these present Claim(s) the Defendant(s) indifference to the Claimant’s complaint(s) is demonstrated by the emails from councillor Nigel Coltman dated 16^th December 2003 and David Logan dated 1^st January 2004.
However, it is known to Cllr. Logan that officers of the 1st Defendant frequently paint an inaccurate picture of evens, about which he personally complained during the Area Plans North committee meeting on the 29^th July 1999, such outburst noted by Mr Chester Hudson. Whereas, concerning the Claimant he was/is not prepared to make any investigation at all, save to inflict harm to the Claimant.
PARTICULARS OF ENFORCMENT AND PLANNING APPEALS It may assist the Court to look at a chronological history of the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant over the last 22 years beginning in 1982.
During 1983 the 1^st Defendant issued Tree Preservation Order, number 34 on dangerous and diseased Sycamore trees encircling The Old Steam House. The objective being to hamper the Claimant’s conservation works by preventing the Claimant from removing trees whose root growth and general encroachment via leaf dropping and overhanging branches was accelerating the decay of the wooden structure of the historic building and courtyard walls.
Between 1984 and1985 the 1^st Defendant enforced against the Claimant, seeking to prevent a commercial use of the historic building in question. The Claimant was not served with this Enforcement Notice, but came to know of its existence some considerable time after expiry of all rights of appeal.
Between May and April of 1986 the 1^st Defendant issued an Enforcement Notice requiring the Claimant to cease using TSH as his home. The Secret Session Reports authorising said Notice reveal bias in that they include information not material to the planning process but designed to colour the minds of the committee against the Claimant. For this reason the authorisation was/is defective or flawed, hence ultra vires.
Further, in respect of the 1986 Enforcement Notice the Secret Reports to committee failed to accord the building with any historic interest, which interest alone would be justification for conversion. For this reason also the authorisation was/is defective or flawed, hence ultra vires.
94. It should be noted: at that time, Appellants had no means of accessing said Secret Reports. Therefore, the Claimant appealed the Notice to the Planning Inspectorate unaware of the reasoning behind the enforcement, hence unable to challenge it as to balance.
However, that the history of TSH had not been admitted as a factor where the Defendant Council authorised enforcement, is further reinforced by them arguing at Appeal, the building possessed no historic interest. Additionally, the 1^st Defendant’s assessment of the historic value was supported by Inspector Dannreuther in his Decision Letter, who also incorrectly concluded the building was constructed of corrugated iron. However, subsequent archaeological Reports refute this. Accordingly, the Inspector compounded the unlawful issue of the Enforcement Notice with further incorrect conclusions.
During 1987 the 1^st Defendant prosecuted the Claimant for breach of the extant Enforcement Notice dated April 1986, despite the fact the Claimant had by then moved to a house in Polegate. The Claimant was fined in the Magistrates Court but the case was quashed on Appeal to the Crown Court, hence the prosecution is/was the first of a pattern of malicious prosecutions and/or the beginning of a malicious course of conduct, the member Defendant(s) have not halted.
In 1988 the Claimant applied for planning permission with application WD/88/4640/P. The Claimant asserts that the 1^st Defendant here failed to carry out any consultation as directed by Circular 22/80. Accordingly and despite assertions by the Claimant as to the history of TSH, Inspector Wareham upheld the conclusion of Inspector Danreuther.
Between 1995 and 1997 the 1^st Defendant enforced against the Claimant repeatedly seeking to prevent a/any residential or indeed reasonable or beneficial use of the historic building, he having re-occupied TSH.
The said further enforcement steps took the form of Injunctions seeking to repair what the 1^st Defendant perceived as weaknesses in their 1986 Enforcement Notice. Said weaknesses identified by the Crown Court in recognising parts of the building were not included in the 1986 Enforcement Notice.
Between 1995 and 1996 the Claimant was party to planning applications WD/95/2284/F and WD/96/1767/F. These applications were for conversion of TSH to residential use and B1 commercial uses respectively. As with application WD/88/4640/P, the 1^st Defendant failed to consult either the County Archaeologist or English Heritage as directed by Planning Policy Guidance note 16 (PG16) part B (c) 23, issued in November 1990, despite the Secretary of State stating they will be: “particularly concerned to ensure that local planning authorities take full account of the policies set out in this PPG”.
The above 1995/96 applications became joined at Appeal at which the 1^st Defendant’s conservationist, Chezel Bird, denied the early electricity generating origins of TSH. Inspector Michael, in dismissing the Claimant’s appeals agreed with the Claimant that his decision: “would result in an interference with your home and private and family life”, with reference to his conclusion at 42–44 of his decision letter.
In the same paragraphs 42-44 of his decision letter, Inspector Michael says that TSH: “is a building of no inherent architectural or historic merit, …” Inspector Michael’s decision is/was based on the same incorrect premise that TSH is not a historic building and for this reason the Claimant asserts his decision is, as with the above authorisation to enforce against the residential use, subsequent Appeal and application/Appeal number WD/88/4640/P, ultra vires.
During 1996 the 1^st Defendant secured an Injunction denying the Claimant his right to occupy or otherwise establish a lawful occupation via the Four Year or Ten Year Rules, in any part of the Wealden District, contrary to the Human Rights Act 1998, where subsequently the Defendant(s) recognise and have advised their own planning committees that such oppression constitutes discrimination.
Where the Defendant Council enforced against the Claimant between 1996 and 1998, in parallel they also enforced against Maria Smith and her son Mark Smith then aged 9, seeking to remove domestic items in her ownership being stored at TSH and to remove her and her son from the property, in the process making them homeless.
Maria Smith became the Claimant’s girlfriend, also taking an interest in TSH, so investing time and money to improving the property, with the intention of establishing a permanent residence. Despite the fact Ms Smith had made improvements to the property, the 1^st Defendant insisted the Claimant should remove her personal effects and the improvements made by her, about which he was not empowered.
Maria Smith was forced to engage Mayo & Perkins solicitors, to represent her in the High Court regarding the 1^st Defendant’s application for Injunctions. The cost of her representation ran into several thousand pounds. The Defendant Council did not seek an Order for costs against Ms Smith, nevertheless she suffered loss as a result of the enforcement action. Ms Smith also required advice from a Planning Consultant for her Court appearance.
The stress of the litigation and the refusal of the Defendant Council to deal with Ms Smith fairly concerning TSH, was the cause of much disharmony between herself and the Claimant, and eventually led to and became the cause of the dissolution of the relationship.
As mentioned above and more specifically, during 1997 the 1^st Defendant secured Injunctions requiring the removal of all toilet and washing and food preparation and storage facilities, contrary to the clear requirement of the Health and Safety regulations 1992, which evidence was not put before the Court, it coming in too late and being disallowed.
In the face of further additional threats of enforcement action and multiple visitations at all hours of the day, the Claimant became compelled to remove Ms Smith’s property and remove the said toilet, washing and food preparation and storage facilities, and to remove improvements to an outbuilding not covered by the extant Enforcement Notice, which outbuilding she had occupied after the Defendant Council had been granted the Injunction above, requiring her to move out of TSH. In respect of these acts, the Claimant was obliged to in part compensate Ms Smith for the damage occasioned thereby.
On the 8^th May 1998 the Claimant applied for planning consent citing proof as to the historic value of TSH. In accepting this application number WD/98/0996/F the 1^st Defendant again confirmed they would “carry out consultations” as seen in their letter dated 13^th May 1998. However, they did no such thing. Instead, the 1^st Defendant decided to invoked S.70A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which allows Councils to decline to determine an application within a two-year period, provided that there are no planning considerations of importance newly identified.
In respect of WD/98/0996/F the officers of the 1^st Defendant advised the planning committee that the history they had previously denied, although now confirmed in the Affidavit of Ronald Saunders dated 16^th July 1997 and by letter from the Sussex industrial Archaeology Society dated 14^th May 1998, was nevertheless nothing new for the committee to consider, which decision appears contrary to the advice given in Circular 14/91, hence perverse.
On 16^th April 1999 the Claimant again applied to the 1^st Defendant for planning consent citing further proof as to the historic value of TSH. In accepting this application number WD/99/0810/F, the 1^st Defendant again confirmed they would “carry our consultations”, on which subject the Claimant wrote to the case officer Mr Moss and received reply that it was not a duty.
On contacting English Heritage, the Claimant was advised no consultation request had been received. Whereupon the Claimant again wrote to Mr Moss and discovered that a purported request from the 1^st Defendant to English Heritage, was so garbled, English Heritage had been forced to write seeking clarification as to what the Defendant Council wanted. Accordingly, the Claimant pursued the consultation in place of the 1^st Defendant, which resulted in Monument Protection status, an independent Report and other letters of support from the archaeological establishment.
However, application WD/99/0810/F met with further serious obstruction in the form of a failure to advise concerning earlier rejection of B1 conversion proposals. Hence a recommendation to the Claimant that he should nevertheless re-apply for a commercial use, before the 1^st Defendant would consider any application from him for residential conversion, in these circumstances, appears to constitute a blatant obstruction of the planning process.
Between March and September 2000 the then Leader of the 1^st Defendant, Cllr. Rupert Thornely-Taylor, suggested Ms Smith (not the Claimant) should apply for permission to erect a replacement building. This application was refused by the 1^st Defendant as time wasting but not so, until many more (9) months delay had been experienced.
Between March 2000 and October 2000 the Claimant pursued the commercial use the Chairman of the 1^st Defendant’s Planning Committee (Councillor Hubbard) had invited, until the Economic Development Manager refused to assist the Claimant further as seen in his letter dated 4^th October 2000.
Some time later on reviewing the files, the Claimant finally realised the planning officers had put doubt in the members mind, in the full knowledge they had argued a commercial use in this location would not be appropriate, even photographing their vehicles to prove two cars could not pass in the drive, and supplying other County policy documents to qualify their argument.
The 1^st Defendant, via its members and officers, in suggesting the Claimant should pursue inappropriate development is/was time wasting and incurred him in unnecessary cost.
Since October 2000, the Claimant, realising he would be unable to achieve a fair hearing until the 1^st Defendant’s earlier maladministration was rectified, has lobbied the members and formally requested a Report as to the perceived injustice from the Claimant’s Monitoring Officer as seen in the Claimant’s letter dated 1^st December 2001 and follow on correspondence. This is the correct procedure as far as the Claimant is aware.
On 10^th October 2001, it came to the Claimant’s attention that the 1^st Defendant were able to and did indeed abandon Orders it had made, where these orders were based on incorrect information.
Evidence of this is produced in the Report compiled by Graham Kean, an officer of the 1^st Defendant, concerning a footpath under reference number JT2320.0101b.
It appears therefore, to be accepted practice of the 1^st Defendant, that where they have made an order based on incorrect information, they have “no choice” but to abandon said orders. Consequently, the 1^st Defendant could have put the matter right by this route, but chose not to.
On or about April or May of 2002, the Defendant Council through their agent, the 13^th Defendant, David Phillips sought to enter TSH under a Warrant dated 29^th April 2002. Three other officers of the 1^st Defendant, and Police Constable Crichton accompanied Mr Phillips on this occasion, the 181^st noted visit.
The Claimant challenged Mr Phillips as to his authorisation, which authorisation he was unable to produce as required by the provisions of Article 6 (HRA) and the Planning and Compensation Act(s) and indeed the Local Government Access to Information Act(s). When Mr Phillips was asked if he knew what a malicious prosecution was, he replied: “no comment”.
Accordingly, the Claimant refused entry and formally complained to PC Crichton as to harassment and malicious prosecution. With reference to this complaint the Police confirmed in writing that this matter was planning related, hence civil, and that the Claimant should seek civil redress.
The Claimant wrote to Sheelagh Douglas in a letter dated 27^th May 2002, again seeking a Report from the Defendant(s) Monitoring Officer as to the original enforcement notice, from whence David Phillips claimed his authorisation, however the Claimant heard nothing further and shortly after Ms Douglas resigned suddenly from the 1^st Defendant, without working out her notice.
Ms Douglas’ replacement, the 7^th Defendant was appointed directly from the ranks, without any advertising of the position. Whereas, Ms Douglas had come to work for the Defendant(s) after a rigorous advertising campaign and selection process in line with equal opportunities practices.
On or about the 11^th September 2002 the 1^st Defendant obtained an Interim Charging Order in the High Court seeking possession of TSH. On the 4^th October 2002 the 1^st Defendant via their agents Sharpe Pritchard solicitors, abandoned the proceedings after discovery the Claimant has applied for Legal Assistance and meantime lodged a Counterclaim in the High Court.
The said abandonment was agreed between the Claimant’s solicitor and 1^st Defendant. The Claimant being advised of the arrangement after the event and was contacted by his Eastbourne solicitors by telephone, who then advised him if he did not agree to vacating the hearing, they would advise the Legal Services Commission he was being unreasonable. The Claimant received no documentation at all from his solicitors and had to obtain copy of Sharpe Pritchard’s letter dated 4^th October 2002, directly from the High Court.
Shortly after the conclusion of the Charging Order matter above, the Claimant discovered the 1^st Defendant had terminated the employment of Christine Nuttall. The Claimant believes her conduct led to her dismissal and that the then Leader of the 1^st Defendant, Rupert Thornely-Taylor, sought to act in the interests of the Claimant and the ratepayer, alas without conclusion.
The cost to the 1^st Defendant in pursuing its claims as to costs, is out of all proportion to the sums claimed, running at something like £10,000 per year. In addition, further sums have been allotted to pursuing the Claimant by way of their Recharge Budget. It appears therefore, the 1^st Defendant is prepared to throw unlimited public money at interfering in the Claimant’s private life and peaceful enjoyment of possessions, contrary to best value practices.
The Defendant(s) are fully aware the Claimant is not a man of means. Accordingly, any bankruptcy they intend will not yield sums to justify prosecuting the matter, but will rather have the effect of further interfering in the Claimant’s private life and peaceful enjoyment of possessions, such interference being disproportionate in terms of the harm to the individual. Where such test is a balance of the harm to the state against the harm to the citizen and who is proportionately affected the more.
Additionally, the Defendant(s) seek to remove themselves from any counterclaim, as any bankruptcy would have the effect of transferring the interference directly from themselves to a Trustee. By this means the Defendant(s) hope to dilute the Claimant’s rights under the Human Rights Act. These it appears is/are the Defendants objectives.
THE DEFENDANT’S LOCAL POLICIES – FAVOUR CONVERSION The 1^st Defendant is bound to operate within the terms of its Local Plan and other Policies derived from National Policy and Planning Policy Guidance notes issued from time to time by the Secretaries of State and in accordance with the Town and Country Planning Acts.
Whereas, the 1^st Defendants Local Plan has at all material times contained sections devoted to the conversion of redundant farm buildings or other buildings of either architectural or historic interest.
These policies provide that where a historic building is redundant (hence without a reasonable or beneficial use) conversion will normally be permitted to either a B1 class industrial use or a residential use.
These policies also give precedence to the industrial use over a residential conversion unless for practical reasons this is not appropriate.
With regard to the re-use of historic buildings and the 1^st Defendant’s duty to protect the historic built environment, English Heritage produce a number of publications to guide local authorities and the public.
The Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions (DETR) confirms in a letter dated 20^th May 1999 that: “the term archaeology applies not only to what lies underground but to what may be present in a standing structure”. PPG 16 supports the DETR in this regard.
However, this statement by the DETR is expressly denied by the 12^th Defendant (Monitoring Officer) and the 8^th Defendant (former District Planning Officer).
It is noted that concerning other historic buildings in their area, the 1^st Defendant regularly consults with English Heritage.
PARTICULARS OF FAILURE TO ENFORCE AND ARTICLE 6 FAIR HEARING The Claimant occupied TSH as his home before October 2000 and continued after October 2000 and presently continues to assert his civil right to occupy TSH as his home.
The Claimant asserts the 1^st Defendant was aware the Claimant continued to occupy TSH as his home, but for the avoidance of doubt, the Claimant put the 1^st Defendant on Notice of his occupation of TSH as his home, via letters to their various Chief Executives, to include the 7^th Defendant.
After service of the said Notices, the 1^st Defendant did nothing to prevent the said use of THS by the Claimant as his home, as they had prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998.
The Claimant asserts that where the 1^st Defendant had refused to review the validity of the extant Enforcement Notice dated April 1986 and other committee decisions based on incorrect information, the 1^st Defendant is/was required to enforce to uphold the said Notice and that the 1^st Defendant as the Claimant’s local authority was required to, or otherwise charged with a duty to enforce against the occupation of TSH by the Claimant, in the circumstances described.
The Claimant asserts that the failure of the 1^st Defendant to enforce constitutes an omission or a failure to act, which omission or failure to act was a deliberate effort on the part of the 1^st Defendant designed to deny the Claimant his right to a fair hearing, to challenge the 1^st Defendant’s as to their continuing oppression, as is his right as prescribed by Article 6.
The Claimant asserts the Defendant omitted to enforce as required, and despite their numerous and consistent efforts to prevent the Claimant occupying TSH as his home, prior to enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, because they were fully aware of S. 22(4) that the Claimant could use S. 7 (1) (b) as a defence whenever the act in question took place, hence bringing the 1^st Defendants previous enforcement actions into time for a Human Rights defence.
Consequently, the 1^st Defendant sought other means by which to attack the Claimant, still designed to deprive him of a fair hearing concerning his occupation of TSH as his home.
These other means include the issue of an Interim Charging Order in the High Court dated 11 September 2002 and the insolvency proceedings presently in the County Court, by which the 1^st Defendant hoped to dispossess the Claimant of his legal standing regarding TSH and deprive him of his home via the back door, as may be described elsewhere in this document. The aim being to cause disproportionate harm to the Claimant.
Effectively, the Defendant(s) had or have made a series of bad judgements and now expect the Claimant to pay for their mistakes. Additionally, the Defendant(s) seek to cover up their mistake by destroying the Claimant and also hope by this means to prevent accurate reporting of their conduct to the general public via their Auditors, or at all.
PARTICULARS OF THE DEFENDANT’S STATUTORY DEMAND The Claimant asserts that where the Defendant(s) claim costs by issue of a Statutory Demand dated October 2003 and served on 3^rd December 2003, that these costs arise from the Defendant Council’s long-term unwillingness to reasonably assist the Claimant to secure a recognised beneficial use for the historic building, he occupies as his home, against which it is their function and duty to protect the historic built environment. The refusal to so assist the Claimant is therefore perverse and not in the public interest.
The costs the subject of the said Statutory Demand could not have arisen if the Defendant Council had taken a balanced view instead of “looking to enforce” such as to deal with the Claimant’s applications in a fair and balanced manner. Indeed, the Claimant’s costs relating to the many appeals and Injunctive proceedings could have been prevented, and amount to unnecessary expenditure of both time and money.
In respect of the costs orders the subject of the said Statutory Demand, the Defendant(s) should have appreciated that they were not entitled to the value of their claim in view of the manner in which the order(s) were obtained.
In addition to the above, the Defendant(s) should have known they were not entitled to the value of the order(s) in view of the compensation likely to be awarded to the Claimant in relation to his complaints to the Defendant(s) such compensation being such as to extinguish the Defendant(s) claim(s).
Whereas, it has been clearly established in the case between Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation 1948 that the Defendant(s) being a local authority, owes the Claimant a duty to act reasonably and not irrationally, and must not make a decision or initiate an action or sustain a refusal to act that is perverse, and especially so where such actions or decisions are to the disadvantage of, or prejudicial to the Claimant or otherwise exhibit bias.
Where the Claimant has applied to the 1^st Defendant, on a number of occasions, for planning permission to attain recognition for his use of The Old Steam House, the Claimant has been unhelpful and consistently and deliberately obstructed the Claimant’s application(s) contrary to the principle established in Davis v Wansdyke District Council 2001 (Bristol County Court).
PARTICULARS OF INTENTION TO BANKRUPT – TO OBTAIN POSSESSION The 1^st Defendant has aided and abetted and encouraged third parties to seek possession of the Claimant’s home.
The 1^st Defendant has itself sought to take possession of the Claimant’s home as per the Application for an Interim Charging Order dated 11 September 2002.
The 1^st Defendant via their agents has made it clear to persons on separate occasions that it is their intention to bankrupt the Claimant to resolve the planning stalemate to their satisfaction, should they fail to remove him from his home by other means. The Claimant intends to call witnesses to provide oral evidence to the facts in the circumstances where a written statement in not considered appropriate and may compromise said witnesses.
Whereas, the intention to attain said possession for such purpose is contrary to the Human Rights Acts 1998, the intention being to interfere with the Claimant’s peaceful enjoyment of his home.
Since November 2002 the Claimant has written to the Defendant Council offering to negotiate in the hope the matters complained of might be resolved without the need to litigate. The immediate response to his letter to the Defendant Council’s Chief Executive dated 21^st July 2003 (and copied to their Executive Cabinet) was for the 8^th Defendant, the former District Planning Officer Ashley Brown, to reply on the Defendant(s) behalf by email refusing the offer out of hand, thereby short circuiting the usual channels of communication.
By this means the Claimant put the Defendant(s) on Notice that his request(s) for action (a Report to the full Council) by their Monitoring Officer was live and an omission actionable in law. The Claimant asserts that not to prepare a Report as to the incorrect historic assessment is, when considering the harm to the Claimant, both unreasonable and breaches of Articles 6, 8 and Protocol 1 Article 1 (HRA).
However, it is noted that neither the Chief Executive to whom the letter dated 21^st July 2003 was addressed, nor the Leader of the Defendant Council, challenged Mr Brown as to why he had taken it upon himself to deal with such an important issue. This is particularly puzzling where Mr Brown had already been relieved from his former position as Director of Environmental Services.
In addition to the reasoning given above, a secondary objective of certain officers of the Defendant Council in pursuing the Claimant to bankruptcy, appears to be to prevent the Claimant pursuing claims against them in respect of the above described prejudicial and unfavourable treatment about which there is evidential reference herein.
The Claimant relies on independently made recordings as transcripts, and other information overheard in the course of pursuing planning applications lodged with the Defendant Council. This information is supported by witness statements for the most part, but where no statement is available, witnesses are available and will be called to give oral evidence in support as mentioned above.
In particular and during the course of pursuing a planning application made in 1998, cited herein, the 12^th Defendant Victorio Scarpa, allegedly authorised by the Defendant Council to make the Statutory Demand dated 15^th October 2003, was overheard speaking with the Claimant’s Local Member, Councillor Jarman and Councillor West, after a planning meeting where the Defendant Council had declined to determine the application he had made, despite bringing proof to the table of the building’s historic origins.
During the exchange between the 12^th Defendant Councillor Jarman and Councillor West, Councillor West mentioned to he was aware of the history of the building, to which Mr Scarpa stated: “the matter would only finally be resolved when they had bankrupt Kruschandl to take possession of the building or put him in prison”. This statement by Mr Scarpa was echoed by Councillor Jarman, now deceased. However, the Claimant will call Councillor West to give evidence of this exchange.
As fact the Defendant Council sought an Order for Committal. However, the 13^th Defendant, David Phillips, had put photographs in evidence they should not have had in their possession, having claimed to have returned them, also attributing an incorrect date to the photographs seeking to mislead the Court as to the facts and in so doing perjuring himself. The Claimant avers this demonstrates malice on the part of the 13^th Defendant.
Where the 1^st Defendant has produced reports to committee designed to gain and sustain authorisation to enforce, the officers had failed to mention to members the historic origins of the TSH building or suggested that this historic building held no viable use, contrary to expert opinion.
According to caselaw cited elsewhere in this document this kind of unbalanced or one-sided report invalidates any decision the Defendant Council may have reached. It follows that any enforcement based on an invalid decision, is itself invalid or ultra vires. To sustain such an argument the Claimant needs to demonstrate that on the balance of probabilities, this is how a report was prepared and presented.
Since the Claimant’s first occupation of the TSH in February 1982 until August 2000, he had no idea the officers of the Defendant Council had not informed the members that a building of local historic interest was devoid of a reasonable and beneficial stand alone use. However, the Claimant now holds evidence to show the 1^st Defendant had known since at least 1984 they were dealing with a historic building, as may be seen from the Statutory Declaration of Chester Hudson dated 14^th August 2000.
Since 1986 the Defendant Council has concealed the truth about the TSH history and failed to properly consult with English Heritage or the County Archaeologist – as they are charged to perform, claiming it is not a duty they must perform. However, such an argument may not be seen as reasonable, when considering the harm the Defendant Council was/is knowingly sustaining concerning interference with his home and peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
The Defendant Council has argued consistently in one enforcement and four planning application appeals before the Secretary of State, that TSH building was devoid of any historic interest, as seen in the various Inspectors decision letters produced as evidence.
PARTICULARS OF AUTHORISATION TO BANKRUPT AND ADVICE Additionally, the Claimant is not aware the 1^st Defendant’s Cabinet has as fact authorised the 12^th Defendant, Victorio Scarpa, to pursue this matter, when it is his understanding that the Cabinet who ultimately control the Defendant Council had via their former Leader Rupet Thornely-Taylor, instructed their Legal Department not to seek to recover the sum(s) the Defendant Council now claim, and on which subject the Claimant would ask the Court for an Order for Discovery.
Further, and in relation to the Defendant Council’s claim for costs, the Claimant is aware of a conversation between Councillor Ryde, formerly head of the Council’s Finance Committee, relating to an Opinion the 1^st Defendant had obtained in relation to recovery of costs. The Claimant’s recollection is that the content of this Opinion spelled out the difficulty in obtaining such costs, which might attract discrimination claims, where the Council had acted in such manner as to attract a claim against negligence or obstruction. It would seem reasonable that the timing of the Defendant Council’s Statutory Declaration would have been based on this Opinion so as to limit or eliminate the possibility of counterclaim.
The Claimant asserts that this Opinion is material evidence of the Defendant Council’s knowledge they are now acting unlawfully, where the manner of instructing is suspect and indeed demonstrates the mind-set of the Defendant(s) as to the malice in their present course of action. A sum for this and other Opinions is shown in the Council’s accounts against which the Claimant would ask the Court for an Order for Discovery.
The Defendant Council had ample opportunity to pursue this matter when the Claimant asked their former Chief Executive, Sheilagh Douglas, to do so several years ago. The timing of the 1^st Defendant’s Demand comes after refusal to mediate and after the Claimant asked them to confirm statutory limitations relating to a stable they demolished unlawfully, now rebuilt, which timing is designed to maximise the disturbance to the Claimant’s life and interference to the occupation of his home.
It may be that the 1^st Defendant is statute barred from further recovery proceedings and indeed the Defendant(s) are required to account for the extraordinary delay in pursuing these matters, if not for the purpose of escalating their demand and limiting counterclaims, to suit their stated long term intention to bankrupt the Claimant.
Consequently, and in consideration of the loss of peaceful enjoyment the Claimant has suffered and having regard to the circumstances herein described, so perpetuating a situation where the Claimant is unable to resume the said peaceful enjoyment he is entitled to, until the matters above are effectively resolved, the Claimant respectfully seeks the assistance of this honourable Court.
PARTICULARS OF THE MONITORING OFFICER, ARTICLE 6 & NEGLIGENCE The Defendant’s Monitoring Officer is required to make report to the full council in any matter involving or likely to sustain an injustice as seen in the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 (C42) at S. 5 subsection 2 It shall be the duty of a relevant authority’s monitoring officer, if it at any time appears to him that any proposal, decision or omission by the authority, by any committee or officer of the authority or of any joint committee on which the authority are represented constitutes, has given rise to or is likely to or would give rise to – (a) a contravention by the authority, by any committee, sub-committee or officer of the authority or by any such joint committee of any enactment or rule of law or of any code of practice made or approved by or under any enactment; or (b) any such maladministration or injustice as is mentioned in Part III of the [1974 c. 7.] Local Government Act 1974 (Local Commissioners).
Whereas, the Claimant entered into correspondence with the Chief Executive and Monitoring Officer of the 1^st Defendant on a number of occasions, formally requesting that the Defendant(s) Monitoring Officer should investigate and make report as to their Council’s failure to identify the Claimant’s home as a building of some historic importance, which history the Monitoring Officer, Chief Executive, former District Planning Officer, Conservation and Enforcement Officer’s and lately the Leader of the Council (the 2^nd Defendant) denies. That this is so is a matter of evidence and for the Court to consider.
However, despite the clear requirements of the Local Government Act 1989, the Defendant(s) refused to investigate or compile a report, or to ensure that their Monitoring Officer fulfilled his statutory duty/function. The said request(s) for a report were copied to members of the Defendant Council.
That the Defendant(s) Monitoring officer must investigate is further reinforced in a letter from the DETR dated 25^th October 1999, wherein it is stated: “The monitoring Officer must investigate and report to the council any case where maladministration or injustice has occurred.”
The failure of the Defendant(s) to ensure their Monitoring Officer makes a report as to injustice, or omission, has caused the Claimant harm, where the injustice could have been identified and put right, but that in this case the Defendant(s) appear not to want their Monitoring Officer to investigate the matters complained of so as to perpetuate the injustice, or for fear the or any identified injustice might lead to claims of compensation.
In this case the Defendant(s) Monitoring Officer is also the 1^st Defendant’s solicitor and legal services manager, apparently having conduct of this matter since at least 1986.
The Monitoring Officer is clearly important in this matter, for the Monitoring Officer sitting in his role as legal adviser to the Planning Committee, has introduced the identity of the applicant, being the Claimant, as a material consideration. Whereas, a solicitor is an officer of the Court bound to present balanced reports to a committee, not containing irrelevant information likely to cause misdirection, a committee being a quasi court. This is so even where such balanced information may be detrimental to his client’s interests.
The identity of a person applying for planning permission is not to be introduced as a Material Consideration, after the findings of the Local Government Ombudsman in his Report investigating complaint numbers 94/B4989 and 95/B/2327 against Castle Point Borough Council.
Equally, the issue of bias or apparent bias has been ruled to invalidate any decision reached by a planning committee, as per R. v Bassetlaw ex parte Oxby (Dec 1997) wherein the High Court declared as illegal and void a grant of planning consent tainted by actual or apparent bias.
The Claimant asserts that a planning refusal or indeed an enforcement report tainted by actual or apparent bias should be declared illegal or void, where the general principle applies to any decision reached by a committee of a local authority.
In that the Monitoring Officer, in failing to make report as required by the Local Government Act(s), as to the apparent bias he personally introduced, not only are the Defendant(s) in breach of a statutory requirement, but the Defendant(s) through their Monitoring Officer’s refusal to fulfil his statutory function, are also knowingly perpetuating a situation where the Claimant may not enjoy the use of his home either peacefully or without interference contrary to the Human Rights Act, Article 8 and the Protocol 1, Article 1, and/or after the decision of the Secretary of State in Duffy v New Forest District Council 2001.
That the 1^st Defendant’s Monitoring Officer was/is live to the issues raised herein is confirmed in correspondence where he refuses to release closed session reports, or to reveal his root authority relating to enforcement issues. In so doing depriving the Claimant of a truly fair hearing, in any matter bound to traverse the chronology of previous planning decisions, contrary to the Claimant’s Convention rights under Article 6.
Whereas, it is recognised in the circumstances where the right of freedom to information under Article 10, or the protection of a persons right to a fair hearing under Article 6, arises as a consequential requirement of protecting another Convention right as per Gaskin v Untied Kingdom 1989 12 EHRR 36, this case relating to an Article 8 issue and discovery of file documents.
Equally, as in the above decision involving the New Forest District Council, the matter of bankruptcy or causing the family concerned to face possible bankruptcy was considered by the Secretary of State to be an unlawful interference in the Duffy family home.
The 1^st Defendant’s Monitoring Officer personally advised the Area Plans South planning committee that TSH was a stand-alone building. At this same meeting he advised the members that the use they (the Defendant(s)) recognised for the building was an ancillary use.
The Claimant here asserts that a stand-alone building may not be enjoyed in an ancillary capacity where no other building is occupied alongside. Hence, the logic applied where the Claimant is concerned is not consistent with other decisions of the Defendant(s) implying either: perverse, unreasonable or irrational decision-making or the modern day equivalent of this, being discrimination.
The Claimant further asserts that the Defendant(s) failure to identify a reasonable and beneficial use for TSH, is contrary to the public interest, where the overriding public interest must be to conserve the local historic built environment as per the recommendations of the English Heritage Monument Protection Programme.
Accordingly, and in the circumstances where it is/was known to the Defendant(s) that their Monitoring Officer could not act impartially where, he personally and his department and other long term colleagues would be the subject of the/any investigation, it appears to the Claimant that the Defendant(s) also failed in their duty to ensure officers capable of carrying out their function were appointed to the task.
The Claimant here asserts that in the interests of good housekeeping, it is vital that local authorities appoint pro-active Monitoring Officers sufficiently removed from the day-to-day administration as not to become the subject of any complaint, hence maintain impartiality.
PARTICULARS OF THE DEFENDANTS CONSERVATION EXPERTISE As to the duty of the 1^st Defendant to the historic built environment, the 13^th Defendant, David Phillips, is the 1^st Defendant’s National Parks representative and conservation officer. Hence, he is cognisant as to archaeological and conservation issues.
The 5^th Defendant, Cllr. Mrs Sylvia Tidy, is thought to be a member of the South Downs Conservation Board and work closely with David Phillips on conservation issues. Hence, she is cognisant of archaeological and conservation issues.
Councillor Tidy was also Chairman of the former Strategic Planning and Economic Development committee known as SPED. In this position she had responsibility for planning issues and could have used her authority to order a review of the Claimant’s case by the Monitoring Officer.
Concurrent with her Chairmanship of the SPED committee, Cllr. Tidy sat on the Area Plans South Sub Planning Committee (APS). She spoke in favour of the Claimant exploring the commercial application. Councillor Hubbard and other councillors were suggesting on officer recommendation so as to obstruct the Claimant’s 1999 planning application WD/99/0810/F.
During the consideration of the application WD/99/0810/F, Cllr. Tidy referred to TSH as a “storage shed” also stating that “This is not a building worthy of conversion”. Whereas the floor area is greater than most modern bungalows and the layout lends itself easily to conversion without disturbing the original structure.
The 8^th Defendant and former District Planning Officer, Ashley Brown, is thought to be an amateur archaeologist, remembered for lobbying Members for funds for a Windmill in need of general maintenance at Argos Hill. This windmill being in the 1^st Defendant’s ownership.
The Claimant’s former Local Member, Councillor Jarman, was an amateur archaeologist (as reported in his obituary). Yet he declined to speak with the Claimant or represent him. Cllr. Jarman lived next door to Herstmonceux’s local historian. The local historian published articles in the ‘Parish Pump’, the local magazine, confirming the origins of TSH.
The Claimant alleges the relationships between officers and members are cosy and may impair the said officers’ and members’ duty to render impartial decisions. This will best be achieved by oral examination of the Defendants under oath.
PARTICULARS OF DUTY TO HISTORIC BUILDING & NEGLIGENCE It is the duty of the 1^st Defendant to protect the historic built environment. Where a historic building is unlisted and unscheduled, the Council should seek to protect a building of local interest via the planning process.
That this historic building should be protected via the planning process, is clearly stated in the Step 4 Report of a Monument Protection Programme, compiled by English Heritage dated June 2000.
On receipt of a planning application, it is every Council’s duty to consult generally. On receipt of a planning application citing history as a reason to grant planning permission, it is the accepted procedure that Council’s should consult English Heritage and the County Archaeologist. This procedure is clearly laid out in Planning Policy Guidance note 16.
Most Council’s compile a Local List of buildings of interest in their area. The 1^st Defendant has not done so despite representations as to this shortcoming.
The Claimant has afforded the Defendant Council every opportunity to grant planning permission and/or to negotiate for a planning permission, via applications in 1988, 1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999.
The handling of the Claimant’s 1998 planning application demonstrates the Council’s refusal to follow the correct consultation procedure to prevent any outside expert historic assessment from reaching the members, Inspectors or the Courts.
The 1999 planning application demonstrates that where the correct consultation procedure was initiated by the Claimant, the 1^st Defendant then further misdirected the Members to refuse the application, having put it in the mind of the Chairman of the planning committee and other leading councillors, to ask the Claimant to pursue a commercial application.
That this may have appeared reasonable to the Members at the time, had they been advised by the officers as to the finding of Inspector Michael on Appeal concerning such a proposal, the members would surely have questioned the proposal.
However, the officers, led by Julian Black, did this “deliberately” in the full knowledge they had already argued at a planning appeal, a deficiency in access for a commercial use at TSH, going so far as to supply colour photographs of their own cars parked on the drive, to prove their point. This point was advanced by Inspector Michael and confirmed as a reason for refusal in his Decision Letter.
The 1^st Defendant’s solicitor allegedly authorised to pursue the Statutory Demand, Victorio Scarpa, led a planning committee and the (Claimant who was sitting in the gallery) to believe that applying for lawful a development certificate, was a “stage” to go through, prior to considering any planning proposal, which appears not to have been sound advice, and merely a delaying tactic designed to exhaust the Claimant’s resources, patience and willpower.
The unwillingness and general unhelpfulness concerning the Claimant and his residential, or indeed any reasonable or beneficial occupation of TSH building, exhibited by the Defendant Council amounts to obstruction and has caused the Claimant loss, anxiety and worry and run out the time he would otherwise have held to enjoy his home.
The pursuit of sums accumulated as result of the 1^st Defendant’s long-term agenda to resist applications in the manner described in this document and in the full knowledge of the ongoing injustice and/or harm to the Claimant, amounts to a malicious course of conduct.
The Defendant(s) by upholding their extant 1986 Enforcement Notice, in the full knowledge it is defective, constitutes a breach of their duty to protect local history, being either a negligent decision or the result of wilful misconduct or reckless indifference.
PARTICULARS OF ENGLISH HERITAGE & DEFENDANT’S INDIFFERENCE Further evidence to demonstrate the 1^st Defendant’s denial of the history attaching is the report by their conservationist, Chezel Bird, where the lady states that in her opinion the building holds no historic interest and goes on to deny the electricity generating origins. This was in 1995-6. Chezel Bird formerly worked for English Heritage, consequently, would be familiar with the consultation procedure seen in PPG16.
When the Claimant contacted English Heritage in 1999, they confirmed commissioning a Monument Protection Programme (MPP) in 1994 as a means to identify and protect the scarce buildings, witness to the dawn of the age of electricity.
When the Claimant brought this to the attention of the Planning Inspectorate, they confirmed in a letter dated 16 July 2002 it was not in their power to restore the position and that they had simply accepted the Defendant Council’s evidence in good faith. Presumably, unaware of the obstruction the Claimant was/is experiencing, the Inspectorate advised applying for planning permission yet again, despite the findings in the Scottish case confirming the planning appeal system failed to conform to the Human Rights Act, Article 6.
The Claimant asserts that the planning system has not yet caught up with the Human Rights Act 1998 where it limits appeals to the High Court on a point of law only. Therefore, the planning system as it stands offers no truly independent remedy to the Claimant, should the Defendant Council continue to deny the history of TSH and the Planning Inspectorate uphold their previous decisions.
It would appear that as the Defendant Council have refused to negotiate a settlement, the only sure way to achieve a fair hearing in a reasonable time, is to seek a Declaration from the Court as to the validity of previous decisions affecting the TSH, to include the wilful misconduct or alternatively reckless indifference of the Defendant Council.
PARTICULARS OF VOID ENFORCEMENT & PLANNING DECISIONS Additionally, where the planning committee sitting to determine the Claimant’s application number WD/98/0996/F were directed by their legal advisor (the 12^th Defendant) as follows: “there would be considerable incentive for this applicant to carry on as he is at the moment, put the planning permission in his back pocket and perhaps pass it on when he eventually sells it to somebody else….” Thus, the 12^th Defendant directed the 1^st Defendant’s planning committee to consider matters not pertinent to the application, so seen at 8:18 of the Transcript.
Whereas, in the case of R v Canterbury City Council ex parte Springimage Ltd (JPL 1993), it was established that any decision by a planning committee based on incorrect information and/or direction as to the law is void. In application 0996 above, the 1^st Defendant’s solicitor misdirected the Members to ignore fresh evidence as to the history of The Old Steam House, which evidence is a material consideration, and in this matter the most important factor to consider.
When considering the Defendant(s) duty to be reasonable and whether they acted reasonably in this case, the Claimant cites R. v Teeside Development Corporation ex parte William Morris Superstore PLC & Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council (JPL P.23 1998). This case set the precedent where balanced reports should be presented to committee, rather than bits of advocacy to support one point of view.
In a later case citing the Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council case, R. v Selby District Council ex parte Samuel Smith Old Brewery (CO/2561/99) the precedent was extended so that a failure to consider other material planning considerations constituted an imbalance. Whereby council officers must give the members of the Council a balanced view with supporting information, which the Claimant asserts they failed to do.
Consequently, in light of the Defendant(s) present action seeking to bankrupt the Claimant, and they refusing to act on the Claimant’s reasonable request for their Monitoring Officer to compile a Report as to the perceived maladministration, that and other misinformed decisions constituting an omission, leading to and perpetuating injustice, the Claimant asserts that he is entitled to seek declarations as to the validity or otherwise of the Defendant(s) extant decision(s) refusing the Claimant planning permission for his home, such that would ensure peaceful enjoyment and other compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998.
PARTICULARS OF INCOMPATIBILITY ISSUE – LIMITED RIGHT OF APPEAL v ARTICLE 6 In the case of County Properties v Scottish Ministers (July 2000) it was determined that the Scottish planning system provided no right of appeal to an independent tribunal established in law, where the right of appeal to the High Court was limited, in that case requiring assessment at to the historic value of a building, the Court ruled it did not have the necessary jurisdiction to review the substantive issues of the case.
Concerning the finding of Lord Mac Fadyen in the Scottish case, it may be the Court would wish to consider issuing a Declaration of Incompatibility. This may come about where the building the Claimant occupies as his home is of some historic value, which the 1^st Defendant has consistently denied. Accordingly, it appears that English planning law as defined by the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended, fails to satisfy the requirement of Article 6 of the Human Rights Act, intended to secure for everyone the right to a fair hearing.
The 1^st Defendant’s Monitoring Officer has refused to compile such Report in denial of his statutory function, but continued to threaten the Claimant repeatedly as to bankruptcy, also in denial of the Claimant’s right to a fair hearing.
The 1^st Defendant’s officers have maintained the position they adopted by choice in 1987 or 1988, they have consistently worked to conceal the historic truth from being discovered, had they consulted either English Heritage or the County Archaeologist. In so doing the 1^st Defendant was forced to nurture an untruth so as to sustain a regime designed to deny a/any planning consent to the Claimant. Consents have been afforded other applicants in similar circumstances, which inconsistency in both approach and in granting consent to others, highlights the 1^st Defendant’s discrimination against the Claimant.
In the case of Slough Developments v Welwyn Hatfield Garden City Council, significant damages (£48 million) were awarded to the developer, where it was established officers of that council had kept information of their ownership of a competing property from the developer. In so doing in the words of the Court, “nursing a lie”.
From about 1993, the 1^st Defendant’s efforts to cover earlier impropriety regarding the incorrect history were accelerated such that they blatantly neglected procedural compliance, in order to take advantage of the Claimant’s procedural ignorance as a layperson, and in the knowledge the Claimant was unable to afford litigation with representation. The 1^st Defendant correctly deduced the risk would put off the Claimant. This is especially so where the 1^st Defendant took great care not to provide the Claimant with information or otherwise assist.
After discovery of proof as to the correct history and procedure beginning in 1997, it became clearer the Defendant(s) had an alternative agenda directed at the Claimant personally, where resistance as to the actual use of the building has/had subsided in favour of seeking financial ruination. So diverting attention away from discussion about TSH.
The Claimant believes this tactic has been adopted by the Defendant(s) because they fear(ed) invoking human rights issues from where the Claimant might qualify for legal assistance, hence be in a position to obtain expert legal and planning advice and/or representation for a/any hearing.
The Claimant is aware that some Members of the 1^st Defendant are opposed to the officer’s conduct which they recognise as a malicious course of conduct, or vendetta, some of which Members are speaking out against.
If the objective of the 1^st Defendant had been to recover monies, then they were asked by the Claimant to proceed to recovery several years ago (in 2000), but failed to act until they believed they had run the Claimant out of time. Correspondence from the Chief Executive to member(s) suggests this Council were only too pleased to take a back seat while other persons having a financial claim against the Claimant’s home, had a go at taking possession, since this was/is their objective, to break the occupation, hence remove the Claimant’s standing regarding his home.
However, such co-operation between the 1^st Defendant and a recently appointed Trustee based at Crowborough, who did in fact seek possession of TSH last year, raises questions as to the reasoning of the Council, where clearly if the Claimant’s Trustee had succeeded, they could then obtain nothing financially themselves.
Between September and November 2003 the Trustee reviewing the Claimant’s 1993 bankruptcy decided to abandoned his possession claim, so advising the Defendant Council. The 1^st Defendant took up the matter such as to again raise bankruptcy as an issue. The objective being to part the Claimant from his occupation of the historic building, so to deprive him of his standing in the matter and eliminate argument involving TSH, which might otherwise surface. The Defendant(s) hope(d) to achieve this by bankrupting the Claimant for a second time, then appointing a their own Trustee to obtain possession via the back door.
PARTICULARS OF INCONSISTENCY, BIAS OR DISCRIMINATION The 1^st Defendant is under an obligation to apply its policies consistently and fairly. In similar circumstances and location, one might therefore expect the 1st Defendant to refuse residential permission on redundant buildings in the countryside and adjacent residential property.
However, there is demonstrable inconsistency, where an old farm milking shed some 800 yards distant east, being of no particular historic or architectural interest, listed or otherwise cited on a Monument Protection Programme, was granted permission for conversion to a single dwelling house. The Claimant refers to photographs of The Old Dairy.
Other similar applications such as WD/98/0806/F, WD/97/1806/F and WD/97/2636/F for the retention of redundant farm buildings were not refused, or the applicant advised to apply for a commercial use, as being a reason for refusal, but in these cases where the applicant had not furnished a statement as to his efforts to market the property in question commercially, the other residential applications were simply deferred by the 1^st Defendant so as not to put the applicant(s) to additional trouble in having to re-apply.
The Claimant asserts that the ownership of a property has little to do with the appropriate stand alone use it should be accorded. However, we can see from the 8^th Defendant’s letter dated 16^th March 1999, that the Defendant(s) have in their minds linked the two separate issues. It is noted that the 8^th Defendant, Mr Brown is replying in respect of a conversation between the Claimant and the 13^th Defendant, David Phillips. The Claimant asserts this is evidence as to the Defendant(s) discrimination against himself.
In the same letter Mr Brown suggests that if the Claimant feels his Convention rights have been infringed, he should seek the appropriate remedy. The Claimant takes this to be an admission as to infringement, but that the 8^th and 13^th Defendants are also thumbing their noses, safe in the knowledge the Claimant is not a man of means, hence will be unable to seek redress.
The reason the 1^st Defendant put the Claimant to the additional trouble, was to obstruct the Claimant and keep him going in circles, in the hope he will eventually give up trying to correct the perceived injustice.
PARTICULARS OF MEMBERS DUTIES In the case Wilson v First County Trust 2001 in the Court of Appeal, the first declaration of incompatibility between the Human Rights Acts 1998 and Consumer Credit Act was made, wherein the general principle was established that the provisions of the 1998 Act have an effect on cases involving private parties. In this case the private parties are Officers and Members of the Defendant Council, separately or collectively since they perform a public function, should that become an issue.
Where the rights in question touch upon positive obligations and deal with cases involving common law, the Claimant relies on the obligation to develop common law to be compatible with Convention Rights (by virtue of s. 6(3).
In consideration of the Convention Rights and the 1^st Defendant’s “Members code of conduct”, the elected Members appear to be under an obligation to promote equality by not discriminating unlawfully against any person, as seen at Part 1 General Obligations 2 (a).
The Claimant asserts that the 1^st Defendant accepts discrimination is unlawful, as per Article 14 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and expects its Members to apply Convention rights. It also follows the officers of the 1^st Defendant are expected to function in harmony and also to promote equal rights.
Concerning liability, if the Officer Defendants argue they did what they were told – the Member Defendants will argue they were not advised. Such argument presenting a catch twenty-two situation, as to blame and/or punishment. Accordingly, this may be a matter for the Court regarding Article 13 of the European Convention, as to effective remedy.
PARTICULARS OF THE LEADER’S INDIFFERENCE OR NEGLECT The Claimant recently spoke with the Leader of the 1^st Defendant, Councillor Nigel Coltman, again raising the issues herein, having laid out his concerns in writing some time ago. The Claimant hoped Cllr. Coltman might be sympathetic to his cause and his duty to the ratepayer.
The newly elected Leader, Cllr Coltman replied to the Claimant earlier by letter dated 14^th August 2001. In this letter Cllr. Coltman confirms he has read: “all the arguments you present, and agree that my new role as Executive member with responsibility for Finance, brings me concern about the cost of your application to the Wealden ratepayers.”
As far as the Claimant is aware, Cllr. Coltman has taken no direct or indirect action designed to prevent the officers continuing with their malicious course of conduct. If he has done so, he did not mention it to the Claimant when they spoke in December 2003. The Claimant asserts that in failing to halt the vendetta, Cllr. Coltman is actually condoning the course of action and joined in the matter.
Nor did Councillor Coltman indicate he would or intended to, place controls on his officers on which the Claimant could rely, but suggested yet another planning application, which the Claimant takes as an admission to the facts. When asked about justice and the Statutory Demand, Cllr. Coltman said simply: “do what you have to do”.
On the 11^th December 2004 the Claimant emailed Cllr. Coltman reiterating his offer of mediation, but has since heard nothing from the recipient.
The Claimant distributed copy of the 1^st Defendant(s) ‘Members Code of Conduct’ to every member on 12^th December 2004 by email and as an attachment.
Subsequent to the above conversation, but prior to issue of these present particulars the Claimant received a copy of an email anonymously through the post, dated 16^th December 2003. It appears this message was sent by Cllr. Coltman to every member of the 1^st Defendant, or at least to his fellow party members.
The email message warns the members not to communicate with the Claimant, containing many remarks of a discriminatory nature also decrying the history attaching to TSH. From this message, the Claimant deduces that Cllr. Coltman has either not familiarised himself with the papers as he claims, or is deliberately passing incorrect information to fellow members raising valid concerns as to misconduct or alternatively that he is indifferent and disinclined to trouble himself with the matter regardless of the implications or harm thereby caused to the Claimant.
PARTICULARS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUE & COSTS It appears that part of the costs claimed by the 1^st Defendant relate to an Appeal by the Claimant to keep toilet facilities as required by Health and Safety Regulations 1992. In this case the 1^st Defendant acted unreasonably in seeking to deprive the Claimant of such facilities where statute provides said facilities as a right. Accordingly, the 1^st Defendant acted contrary to Wednesbury principles and the duty to act reasonably in dealings with the public. At the time of that hearing the Claimant did not have evidence to prove the history of the building, subsequently made available.
In addition to the foregoing, the 13^th Defendant, David Phillips, having conduct of another similar enforcement issue relating to toilet facilities and the complaint of a separate unauthorised residential use, WD/94/0929, advised the 1^st Defendant’s planning committee that: “No planning permission is required for the installation of a toilet in this building.” Hence, there is demonstrable inconsistency when dealing with the Claimant regarding sanitation.
It appears another part of the claimed costs relate to a Lawful Development application made at a time before the Claimant had been asked by Councillor Hubbard to apply for a commercial use. This obviated any benefit from an Appeal, which the Claimant then sought to withdraw, but which the Defendant Council refused to agree, said Appeal having been lodged with the Planning Inspectorate. Here to, the Inspectorate appeared to refuse the Appellant his right to withdraw, insisting the Appeal should proceed. At this time the Claimant had new evidence of the history of the building, which the Defendant(s) were doing their utmost to stifle.
In relation to these matters and the conduct of the Defendant(s) the Claimant is seeking restoration of his civil rights from the 1^st Defendant about which the Claimant placed the 1^st Defendant on Notice on 8^th January 2000 by recorded delivery and subsequently re-stated these claims when the Defendant Council applied to the High Court for a Charging order between 11^th September and 7^th October 2002.
As mentioned previously the Claimant was unable to pursue the matter in October 2002, when the 1^st Defendant withdrew immediately and on realisation the Claimant had applied for Legal Assistance to further his claim via Mayo and Perkins, a firm of Eastbourne solicitors.
PARTICULARS OF WEBSITE PUBLICATIONS & ARTICLE 10 INTERFERENCE What has further motivated the Defendant(s) is ongoing action wherein the Claimant continues to assist other victims of enforcement generally via a website distributing planning caselaw and featuring cases where the 1^st Defendant’s have been found guilty of maladministration by the Ombudsman or the Courts.
The 1^st Defendant has taken legal advice as to removal of the website. This is confirmed in a front-page newspaper feature in the Sussex Express dated 14^th February 2003.
The Claimant asserts that the right to freedom of expression and to receive and impart information is protected via the Human Rights Act 1998, Article 10. The Defendant Council could not therefore approach this objective directly. The Claimant believes this additional fact has caused the 1^st Defendant to finally pursue him to bankruptcy as threatened regularly since about 1995.
In particular, the Claimant assisted and represented a local horse sanctuary at appeal after the 1^st Defendant had demolished their stables. Having personally suffered attacks by the 1^st Defendant the Claimant used this knowledge to obtain a favourable decision at appeal.
The officer heading the enforcement campaign against the Claimant for the Defendant(s), prior to enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, is David Phillips. Mr Phillips has already admitted misleading the 1^st Defendant’s planning committee in the Eastbourne County Court concerning a Mr and Mrs Roger Brown. This officer is also responsible for taking action against a Mr de Rivaz, where he was advised by the 1^st Defendant’s solicitor, Mr Scrapa, they had no legal standing. However, this did not dissuade Mr Phillips and later the Ombudsman found against the Council in that matter.
It appears to the Claimant likely that Mr Phillips is heading the unfavourable actions directed at his person. There is a web page about Mr Phillips, that is one of the most frequently visited concerning the operation he lead to demolish the above mentioned Horse Sanctuary. The next most popular page concerns whistleblowing. It is believed the Defendant Council does not have a ‘whistleblowing policy’ as encouraged by central government. Mr Phillips has not responded to the page, despite being invited to do so.
Mr Phillips has been with the 1^st Defendant for many years and far longer than that recommended by Lord Nolan. Many above him have retired and his colleagues filled the vacancies, so further imbuing his authority and establishing a cosy relationship, where one officer will naturally assist another in a crisis. It is therefore likely that Mr Phillips has made it known to others persons at the 1^st Defendant that he wants the website down and to employ any means to achieve it.
PARTICULARS OF FURTHER INTERFERENCE Whereas, it is established in law that the 1^st Defendant may not expend public money to protect the reputation of its members or of any officer. If an officer or member has a grievance against any member of the public, they may if they feel they have grounds, institute proceedings privately from their own pocket.
Regarding the 1^st Defendant’s Statutory Demand, it appears planning officers are attempting to use public money to fund for their own purposes and to fight their own private battles, with the backing of the 1^st Defendant’s Directors and possibly Cabinet Members. They appear to be using the pretence of cost recovery as authorisation to further interfere in the Claimant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of his home, hopeful that as a bankrupt they may also attain control of the website highlighting maladministration at the Defendant Council.
Whereas, the Defendant(s) ought to known from Inspector Michael’s Decision Letter that they have caused and sustained interference already, in failing to properly consult and/or apply expert assessment as to the historic value of TSH. Accordingly, seeking to bankrupt the Claimant and cause further disturbance, where the 1^st Defendant is/was at fault, is much the same as when the 1^st Defendant demolished the Bushy Wood Stables prior to Appeal in an attempt to undermine the rights of the Sanctuary owners.
That it is common practice for the 1^st Defendant to seek to deprive members of the public of their right to a fair hearing is demonstrated by the Transcript of a Secret Session report concerning Mr John Hoath and Wityhams, Summersales Farm, dated 10^th Febraury 2000, wherein the Defendant Council’s solicitor, Geoffrey Johnson, advised Members of the Defendant Council not to allow Mr Hoath, his right to be heard in a Magistrates Court because: “I think it would be a mistake in this case to take Magistrates Court action against Mr Hoath because that is exactly what he wants. He will take the Council to the High Court if the Council had the temerity to take proceedings against him.” “But by taking this action in default we are putting the onus onto him to challenge it and that is what he doesn’t like”.
In Mr Hoath’s case it is clear also that the Defendant Council have been working with his Trustee in bankruptcy where Mr Johnson says: “His trustee in bankruptcy is aware of what is going on, and is in just a complicated dispute with him as we are.” The Claimant asserts the similarity between cases and the way the Defendant(s) have proceeded against the Claimant are evidence as to the way the defendant Council routinely function to disadvantage the public. See also Brachers solicitors and Mr Lawrie Trill.
In respect of the above and the claim of authorisation by the 1^st Defendant’s solicitor, it appears from the Defendant(s) Constitution at 14 .3 under Legal Proceedings, that effectively the Council’s solicitor (also the 1^st Defendant’s Monitoring Officer) has authorised himself by virtue of: “……or in any case where the council’s solicitor considers that such action is necessary to protect the Council’s interests”. This requires some clarification, to identify precisely who, when or what committee authorised the various actions against the Claimant and what empowered them to do so.
It may be therefore that in this case the 12^th Defendant, Mr Scarpa, has taken the initiative and where the Claimant is assisting disadvantaged members of the public the officers have taken further dislike to him for sharing his information via the web, against which, they could not otherwise lawfully interfere as per Article 10.
The Claimant asserts that the case history presently growing month on month as a record of the Defendant(s) maladministration, is not something of which the Defendant Council will want reminding. Hence, the 1^st Defendant is likely to resist by whatever means left open to them, which, in this case means attacking the Claimant wherever they feel they can do so and get away with it.
Said further interference in the Claimant’s private life is likely to escalate the cost to the 1^st Defendant, hence the ratepayer, where the Claimant’s response to the 1^st Defendant’s ‘reckless indifference’ and/or ‘discrimination’, has stirred him to greater effort such as to compile yet further case history of perverse decisions and make this information freely available to the public, which in turn the Defendant(s) have thought it necessary to employ a Public Relations officer to operate as a spin-doctor, at more cost to the ratepayer.
Publication of the 1st Defendant(s) suspect dealings, of which the public previously remained unaware, reflects badly on the 1^st Defendant. It is thought that in an effort to protect their reputation, the 1^st Defendant has secured gagging orders in a number of other cases where they would keep the suspect side of their administration and the quantum of awards of damages, and other information from public disclosure.
PARTICULARS OF HERITAGE CONSERVATION & NEGLIGENCE The Claimant asserts that the indifference of the Defendant(s) as to protecting the historic building in their care, by virtue of it being in their district, has over the relevant 22 year period caused TSH to suffer deterioration which it need not have suffered, had any tribunal established in law considering planning issues been advised in a balanced and proper manner.
Whereas, the efforts of the Defendant Council to prevent the Claimant from carrying out essential fauna clearance, and other repairs have burdened him such as to discourage investment, where the Defendant Council ought to have encouraged such works and helpfully guided the Claimant.
The Claimant further asserts that such indifference and/or complacency as to the conservation of our heritage constitutes either: reckless behaviour, negligence, wilful neglect or wilful misconduct.
Whereas, it is generally accepted by experts, including English Heritage, that a building should be possessed of a reasonable and beneficial use so to provide an incentive to developers to invest monies in a redundant building that being devoid of a reasonable use would otherwise not induce a developer to expend time, trouble and expense, with no prospect of enjoyment. Accordingly, not to assist a developer to concerning a historic site may be seen as unreasonable.
The Claimant asserts that a planning application would normally achieve said use and conserve our heritage, but not so where bias is apparent.
The Claimant further asserts that in the absence of any reasonable or beneficial use, works to conserve the original fabric of TSH, to remove harmful add-ons such as the wartime tin cladding, or to replace the defective roof, rainwater goods, gulleys, etc., could not reasonably be entertained by a/any developer, with an extant enforcement notice, etc., although defective, dangling in Damocles fashion such as to perpetuate a planning limbo.
When considering the above in the context of the Claimant’s repeated requests for assistance and recognition, the Defendant Council’s attitude in continuing to deny expert evidence, is not merely arrogance or complacency, but rather a wilful refusal to acknowledge the facts.
The Claimant asserts the evidence will demonstrate, that at no time have the 1^st Defendant offered any genuine assistance to the Claimant as to securing a reasonable beneficial use for the historic building he occupies over the relevant 22 years, and especially so where it is in the public interest to conserve evidence of the past development of our civilisation for future generations.
The Claimant asserts the evidence will also show that enforcement and planning reports prepared by the 1^st Defendant concerning the Claimant, are one sided, sought to discredit the Claimant, gave weight to matters not material to the planning process and relied on information and later on decisions they knew to be incorrect, hence exhibited bias and or indifference in the extreme, about which the Claimant seeks assistance from this honourable Court by way of an effective remedy.

AND THE CLAIMANT CLAIMS: